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ABSTRACT
Guatemala has received extensive foreinn investment 
since the ear l v 19».mV s to develop export, agriculture, 
manufacturing and mineral industries. This studv focuses an 
the years after the 1954 revolution and especially on the 
results of the Central American Common Market and the 
Alliance for Progress programs that encouraged foreign 
investment in manufacturing industries for the regional 
market. While the results show good returns for investors 
there were limited gains m  the economic. social and 
political development of Guatemala. These results led to 
numerous debates over whether foreign investment is 
therefore good or bad. These findings suggest that neither 
conclusion is sufficient. but rather that Guatemala and 
similar countries need domestic policies that encourage 
domestic investment and social and political development in 
addition to foreign investment for economic development.
Vou, buatemai  a,  a r e  a f i s t  and -*
fistful of American dust with 
seeds a small fistful of hop**.
Defend it, defend us, ... because 
in the dark hour'; vou Mere the 
honor, the pride, the diunity 
of the Americas.
Pablo Neruda, 1954.
Although it is sometimes known derisively along with 
other Central American nations, as a banana republic, 
Guatemala is the* largest economy in Central America, a 
region long considered critical to U.3 business and 
security interests.
Since the 1870's, foreign business has enjoyed a 
hospitable investment climate in Guatemala. Not only does 
the country possess abundant natural resources but also 
each Guatemalan leader from the time of Rafael Carrera, 
eager for some semblance of economic development, has 
welcomed foreign investment as a means of financing these 
goals, and thus guaranteed it a "stable" investment
climate. Indeed, it has been a long history of strong-man 
rulei Carrera (1840-1865), Justo Rufino Barrios 
(1873-1885), Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920), and
General  J o r g e  Ubico i 19 ; 1 - 1 944 > .
Th© ear 1 i©at business interests tool advantage uf these 
two situations and established strongholds m  * p u r t  
agriculture. In th© early 190»Vs German capital cant lbuttfd 
much to th© boom in coffee exports* But gradually an 
American company, engaged in the cultivation of bananas, 
attenuated the German influence and bv the end of the first 
World War attained a dominant position for American 
capital. For th# rest of the first half of the L'Uth century 
it would be hard to exaggerate the influence of th* United 
Fruit Company on Guatemala.
Until th© 1950's UFCO and two ot its subsidiaries 
prospered until they essentially controlled the major 
sectors of the Guatemalan economy* agriculture, finance, 
transportation, communications etc... Their political clout 
paralleled their economic success, and the three companies 
would enjoy a "close" relationship with the Guatemalan 
government who maintained the proper political stability 
that also fulfilled the U.S government's security 
objectives during this Cold War pf-iod.
Yet in the 1950's, the reformist, nationalist 
government of Jacobo Arbens challenged the U.S business and 
security interests as he sought to lessen Guatemala's 
dependence on foreign powers. His actions in office upset 
both the manner in which UFCO was accustomed to doing 
business, and frightened the U.S government who feared the 
spread of communism in Latin America. Almost exactly thirty
/e-ar a ago, a ft er a I onu ': »jr i e« j t o  .r> r cn fc • <*. 1 on * and 
accusations between *. he two countries. Arhenz * ■ government 
fell in 1954, ousted by a coup alleged ti have been 
directed by certain elements of the U.S government worl m q  
closely vath United Fruit.
The purpose of this study is. t:o fr and analyse the 
scope, character and effects of foreign investment 
established after 1954 m  the investment climate secured by 
the coup. After this incident, the LJ.S sought to male 
Guatemala a showplace for democracy, and to this end they 
actively encouraged private direct 1 o* ©ign investment.
Foreign investment over these last thirty years in 
Guatemala is a broad and complex topic, but in this 
analysis it will be limited toi
1 ) a discussion of the climate for private investment 
nurtured after 1954 as the U.S government alioted large 
sums of loans and grants so Guatemala could be an example 
to the whole world.
2 ) a review of the special partnership between private
inveetors and the U.S government in the sixties and
seventies. In order to secure their business and security
interests, the U.S funded two programs that were founded \n 
the name of economic development for Latin America and had 
the effect of creating the conditions that spurred a boom 
in foreign investment in a 1.! of Central America, and
especially Guatemala. These programs were the Central
American Common Market (a landmark attempt by developing
nations dependant on o.:port wici.iifun-', to *?* t. <i, l i ,5j>, a 
scheme of regional integration based on the trade of 
industrial goods), and the Alliance for Progress.
3) examples of the specific characteri*tics of foreign 
investment m  Guatemala during this period. An intensive 
examination of the investments in Guatemalan mfrastnir;tur» 
will not be attempted, rather a more general , empirical 
description of the role of foreign capital will follow, 
culminating with a detailed loot at another maior 
investment in Guatemala, that of the Internatianal Nickel 
Company.
In the literature it is most evident that the topic of 
foreign investment provokes strong responses, either 
enthusiastically positive, or sharply critical. A 
presentation of both views will be accompanied bv empirical 
data, that while not always accurate and reliable, give one 
a general idea about the trends in foreign investment in 
Guatemala since 1954.
"Cuando sono la trompeta, eetuvo 
todo preparado en la tierra, v 
Jehova repart 1 o el mundo a Cocc^f.o 
Inc., Anaconda, ford Motors > an,, 
ent 1 dades:
la Compania Frutera Inc. 
st remervo lo mas juqoso, 
la cotta central de mi tierra, 
la dulce cintura de America..."
Chapter 1. LA UNITED FRUIT COMPANY
Pablo Neruda.
r hr au uho* " ■ u'if* toffiu 1. t ‘ s n i f r , f it a i ■ < n r  ,\( I ! f. a i
hc*s played a si i f1 cant role in t hu dc- vel i >pme*n f Li ♦ ♦■he'
ountry's ( c onomy. i r. most of Latin Hme r i< a , for a
period of seven t / years beginning in the 1870's, foreign 
capital, r-h litt*© restriction from the host or capital- 
e/purtinq country, was the major agent at developing and 
financing agr 1 c:ul t ure, port worts, railways, power supplies 
and other basic services, giving Guatemala its 
characteristic export, orientation towards the markets of 
Europe and North America.' Historically, Great Britain, 
Germany and the United States have been the sources of 
investment in Guatemala. Guatemalans often viewed the 
British as harsh creditors since most of the British bonds
were long standing obligations dating back to the 19th
century. Indeed, the British had concentrated thei r
investment in the financial areas through l oans made
directly to the government or private firms through banking 
facilities. Primarily Britain had sought to acquire 
interest in the Central American isthmus as a means of 
controlling future canal routes. However by the turn of the 
century North American dominance in this aspect was 
established? the amount of new British capital entering the 
region and specifically Guatemala became minimal . 3 Since 
the late 1800 11 s, Germany's contribution was substantial and 
expanding by 1913 Germans dominated the coffee sectors in 
such districts as Alta Ver;<pas from where they exported 
directly to Hamburg . 3 Although Germany was initially the
dominant: * oreion presence in Guatemala, Nur' h A.ner u.jn 
investors and traders created .* huge U.’*n economic leverage 
over the region between the 1870’s and the 192o*s.
Increasingly, the United States government felt that it 
was their duty to work with these investors tu e:;< lude 
Europeans and to develop stable internal regime-- that were 
considered necessary for a good investment cl 1 mate.* In 
Guatemala this "partnership" would reach its zenith with 
the overthrow in 1954 of the government of Jacobo Arbenz. 
While this paper will concentrate on foreign investment 
after 1954, a general understand!ng of this process of 
foreign capital expansion that began in the 1870’s is 
necessary.
The Spanish American War seemed to interest the Germans 
in Latin America, German newspaper editorials indicated 
that they would have liked to contest the Monroe Doctrine.* 
However, from 1898 until the outbreak of World War I, 
conditions in the rest of the world never permitted Germany 
to defy the Monroe Doctrine or offend the United States.* 
So Germany limited itself to promoting and protecting their 
commerce, investment and emigrants in Latin America.r Some 
of these actions would includes the blockade of ports, the 
bombardment of coastal towns, the seizure of custom houses 
and the occupation of territory. Because of the possible 
•r*l*tion of these coercive measures to the Monroe Doctrine, 
author J. Fred Rlppy claimed that the United States was 
usually an interested party to them.*
Many German immigrants were dr ;iwn to Guatem.tlri by ^he 
coffee boom. Germany was the major importer o f  Guatemalan 
coffee ( in 1900 they imported 60 percent ) and manv of 
these immigrants maintained credit ties to banling houses 
in Hamburg and Bremen. These financial contact** allowed the 
Germans to take over many Guatemalan coffee holdings in the 
late 1890's and early 1900’s when there was a period of 
depression in coffee.°
In Central America the successful cultivation of coffee 
had been started with national capital but it soon became 
dependent on external financing. In Guatemala a significant 
portion of the production and distribution of coffee became 
controlled by the Germans who although they were m  
Guatemala and often married into the local elite, 
maintained direct commercial and financial ties with their 
native country. Guatemalan efforts to maintain national 
control over coffee production soon collapsed. The main 
difficulty was raising the necessary capital. Efforts such 
as the establishment of a banking system under the state 
control failed and the bank was formed with strong 
participation and control of foreign capital . 10
Guatemalan coffee producers also lagged behind the 
Germans in cultivating and harvesting techniques. The 
Germans had more capital and better connections, imported 
the best machinery and learned the latest methods from 
agronomists brought from Germany. Therefore, their lands
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w&re able to yield more .and noftHw. h 'sueable* 
portion of the landholding class in Guatemala was oi German 
descent. This alonq with the fact that they wure primarily’ 
engaged in agriculture made the German presence and 
investment in Guatemala m^.re palatable, especially to the 
elites. It was not easy to identify "German capital", since 
it entered the nation usually throuqh domestically 
incorporated banks and then lent to a local entrepeneur who 
although of German descent, was a longtime resident married 
to a Guatemalan . 1 1 Hence by 1913 the German community owned 
iu percent of the coffee plantations in Guatemala and yet 
they produced 40 percent of the total harvest.4*
Since the 1870’s as Guatemala grew more heavily 
dependent on coffee for export earnings, the political 
power of the coffee growers grew along with coffee's role 
in the financing of public works.
The lack of adequate transportation in Guatemala had 
weakened Guatemalan attempts at developing and maintaining 
the system of coffee production. Producers totally depended 
on foreign shipping lines to get their coffee to market.** 
In 1873 the new liberal regime set out to construct badly 
needed roads. Much of this system was completed by 1876. In 
this way, ths capital was linked to the cities of 
Queialtenango and Huehuetenango and to the pacific ports. 
Other roads went to San Salvador and the Atlantic port of 
Santo Tomas.1* The regime financed the construction with 
forced loans and taxes on rural properties and provided for
its mo i niennnce ny requiring .;ach n.Hn '•') wnrl or, m i t<i r* l 
davs a year.1* The first railroad wos contracted in K37 / 
and 1QB0 to William Nanne and built with national capital. 
It linked the port of San Jose with Escui nti a ( 188<>) and 
with the capital(1884). The contract provided tor financial 
help from the State for Nanmi's company, 4 «n<) concessions 
and ta;: waivers. In 1884 the Atlantic port later m o w n  as 
Puerto Barrios was founded and construction was begun < 
again with national capital ) an the Northern Railway. 
However in 1885 construction was halted. 1T The Northern 
Railway was not finished until 1908. aft*?* having been 
contracted in 1900 to the Central American Improvc?ment 
Company Inc.1* This would be the beginning of a greater 
presence of North American capital in Uuatemala. The 
earliest ventures in foreign investment in Central America 
are closely identified with certain strong personalities 
who guided them. Perhaps one of the most famous of these 
"characters" was Minor C. Keith who’s name is linked 
inextricably to the railroad and banana industries of 
Guatemala.
Shortly after construction of the nationally funded 
Northern Railway ceased, Minor C. Keith visited Guatemala. 
Born in Brooklyn, Minor C. Keith had always wanted to build 
railroads and so he went to Central America and made his 
fortune doing that. One of his major achievements was the 
first 25 miles of track between Port Limon and the Costa 
Rican capital of San Jose. In 1871 Knith’s uncle, Henry
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Meigqs already a famous railroad man in 3i/u*".h hmerica. i.ad 
invited him to Limon. While that trad was being laid 5 
men died including Keith’s three brothers, After completing 
the railroad Keith’s next problem Mas finding people to 
ride it. Keith and the Costa Rican government had expected 
that passenger revenues would pay the operating costs and 
the immense debts they had incurred during construction. 
Keith's solution was to plant bananas near the trued s, m  
the jungles near Limon. By 1883 he owned three banana 
companies which shipped five million stems each year to (J.S 
markets from four Central American countries and he married 
the daughter of a former Costa Rican president. His 
prosperity was unexpectedly interrupted si;: years later 
when a New York bank failure stuck him with a debt of 1.5 
million dollars. Even though the Costa Rican government 
bailed him out he still had financial trouble. Hence. Keith 
went to Boston to speak with Andrew Preston, an owner of 
the Boston Fruit Company. This trip resulted in the birth 
of the United Fruit Company on March 30, 1899.1 * He had a 
plan for Quatemala that had already proven successful in 
his construction on the Northern Railway of Costa Rica. 
Basically, some new enterprise had to come to the northern 
coastal plains in order to make the railway profitable. 
Keith saw that the lowlands traversed by the railway were 
ideal for cultivating bananas and he was convinced that the 
Northern Railway could be completed and paid for with the 
proceeds of banana freight. He arranged for his United
path ofKru I1 Comp an ✓ t o establish plantations a 1 on g > hr* 
the railway. Once the plantations began to bear fruit teith 
signed a contract on January 1C, lc?04 to extend the
railway. Signed by Percival Farquhar, representing Minor C. 
Keith and his associate William C. Van Horne, and Jose 
Flamenco, Minister of Development ter the government of 
Manuel Estrada Cabrera, this "Farquhar Contract" would have 
a decisive impact on Guatemala’s future. Not only did it 
bring about the completion of the Northern Railway, but 
perhaps more importantly it made possible the rapid growth 
and great success of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. 
At this time the Northern Railway and the United Fruit 
Company ( UFCO ) were not associated, but as they grew 
complemented each other.310 Delmer Foss’ summary of the 
generous terms of the "Farquhar Contract" bear repeating as 
they allow one to see how the roots of North American 
economic power m  L*.tin America ,.egan to take hold.
The agreement conceded the contractors the right 
to const'act, maintain and operate a railway from El 
Rant hr, to San Agustin..., the southern terminus of the 
Northern Railway, to Guatemala City. The contractors 
undertook to finish the railway within three and one 
half years after the Guatemalan legistlature gave its 
approval to the contract, which it did on April 9. In 
return for constructing the railway, the contractors 
were to receive no money. Instead they were given land 
and certain valuable rights and concessions. As soon as
J -
the railroad from r 1
completed and m  operation, the• the government promises to
including all rolling stoel bui i di ng-», tr 1 egr aph
l i nei, the wh«»r f at Puerto Barr i am, and all othi*r r <-»<*!
a »d movable property that belonged in thiNorth«rn
become the private property of teitr, *nd Van Horne, or 
their company. Thc=- only l imitations to this grant were 
that the concerns! onaires could hot sell the railway tc 
the government of any foreign country, and, after 99 
years the government had the option of buying back the 
line by paying the then validated price of the railway? 
the government had six months in which to e n t r c a e  this 
option, and if it did not do so the line beionget to 
the concessionaires in perpetuity. The contractors w«*re 
given sections of shoreline measuring one mile in 
length and one hundred yards in width«..land which the 
government promised never to tax or to expropriate 
unless necessary for national defense. They were 
granted thirty square blocks of land in Puerto Barrios 
and i,9u0 caballerias, 167,000 acres, of other land. 
The government also guaranteed an annual income of five 
per cent on the estimated cost of *4.5 million (U.S) 
for fifteen years. No competing railroads would be
Railway. Th-s was an outright grant - run railway would
allowed within twenty miles of the Puerto Barrios -
- 9
GuatemrU «.-< Cit, arid t h i? go\ *?r i in..-n t pn .in
contractors pr etnren< e i n cant rant s f or ex en
branches that might later bn added to t he main
one of the cl auto* of this contract., which was. to 
become more and more important ay the bar. in a industry 
grew, the government promised thai ships < an y m g  fruit 
would be allowed to sail at. any t \ mn ot the day or 
night. This clause not only expedited tho exportation 
of the fruit, but made possible the irost efficient use 
of the railroad because trains could be loaded and 
unloaded at any hour. Another clause provided that, 
aside from coffee, nil fruit and other agr 1 cultural 
products transported by the railroad would be free from 
export duties and local taxes for a period of 3!5 years 
beginning in 1904... Aside from minor restrictions and 
regulations, and the governmental laws applied to all 
common carriers and railroads in Guatemala, the 
contractors could manage their railway as they pleased. 
Moreover, they could purchase or lease other railways 
or they could combine with other railways if they so 
desired...**
Obviously the terms of the Farquhar* Contract 
opened up Guatemala to Minor Keith's United Fruit Copmpany 
in a way that often seems inconceivable. Not only would it 
allow the company to control the communications and 
transportation networks of Guatemala's interior, but also 
through control of the ports and the railroads, any contact
with the rest of Central America or the outside world, Ois 
in other countries uf Latin America, this selling ot the 
national resources seemed to the government to tie the only- 
way path to economic development - thore were no other 
financial alternat 1 ves, not the Guatemalan treasury *nd no 
other interested foreign investors. It would be hard to 
overstate the influence that the United Fruit Companv could 
now have on t.he Guatemalan economy.
In 1912, the directors of the Guatemala Railway Lompan/ 
changed their* name to International Railways Central 
America (IRCA). Shortly thereafter, IRCA obtained the 
Guatemala Central Railroad and the other railroads in 
Guatemala and El Salvador so they soon controlled most of 
the railway in both countries.** Minor Keith had indeed 
guessed correctly, by 1914 the line transported over 3 
million bunches of bananas and as the railroads linked the 
interior coffee exports grew.**
Potential investors usually sought same assurance of a 
stable investment climate in which they might obtain 
profits and have a secure existence. In the early 1900’s, a 
measure of this essential soundness was a strong leader 
successful at controlling the various sectors of the 
population. In Guatemala since the rule of Rafael Carrera, 
political stability seemed assured. When he died in 1865, 
he was succeeded by Justo Rufino Barrios who established a 
12 year dictatorship (1873*1885) and Manuel Estrada Cabrera 
followed with a 22 year regime <1898-1920) * the longest
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unint e r r u p z ed one-man r u b : l n i„ entr il Airier i c * i. Under these
conditions the power ot the Unlt ed Gt «ten in Central
America grew rapidly and the W i 1 son *nd Cool l dae
administrations demonstrated their willingness to wort with 
North American investors to exclude the Europeans und 
insure stable investment conditions. Tn uuatomul n between 
1913 and 1929 overall exports rose 6^ port, ent but exports 
to the United Statc?s exploded over i5u percent. Vet in 
1729, Germany was still the leadinq market in Guatemdla.24 
The North Americans at least doubled their import markets 
in each of the five nations between 1913 and 1929. a<> By 
1920, the economic and politiral elites of these countries 
understood that not only were they increasingly dependent 
on North America, but also that the North was able and 
willing to reinforce economic dependence with direct 
political and military intervention.
The administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William 
Howard Taft were thought to be the best examples of dollar 
diplomacy, but Woodrow Wilson would refine this practice. 
Dollar diplomacy does not refer to exerting diplomatic 
pressure by paying out bribes here ,»nd there. In reality 
according to Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "dollar diplomacy i * 
the use by American interests abroad of the political 
support of their government, support which they solicit and 
obtain by every imaginable means. Instances of this would 
be diplomatic efforts to obtain certain modification in 
customs laws, taxation, and regulation of concessions. a
m o r e  ex t r e m e  form would bo p r o t e c t i o n  ot nmer j :«*n i r. t: f  %
by the threat or use of force. Mriiw e ample, of both
types of efforts bv the U. ■> government abound. The
revolution of 1903 in Panama was ir ci t w  by «. apitUist 
interests with almost open support at the Nt rth M r h  an 
governmen t. In the Dominican republic, i. b customs
receivership impounded 55 percent of the v * m< nt-y tor 
payment of foreign debtc from 1 * 1/ to 19 34. ' h . s country
wouid remain n financial nr  ot »*c t or at e until 1 4^ I . In 
•-'Nicaragua in 1912, intervention was end or tat en to protect 
two banks - Brown Brothers and Company, and J.W Seliqman 
and Company**', and the U.S Marines stayed and policed 
elections in that country until 1934.*° Actually, between 
1898 and 1920, the United btates Marines entered the 
Caribbean no fewer than twenty times* 11
Before assuming office in ivi3, Woodrow Wilson had 
thought little about the problems of foreign policy and he 
had no experience in that field. But he held certain 
idealistic principles in which he fervently believed.1* 
Wilson maintained that man was sufficiently good and that 
democracy was the most humane and most Christian form of 
government. Every people must then be capable of 
self-government. If they do not achieve it by persuasion, 
it may sometimes be necessary to impose it upon them by 
force.3* For Wilson the true way was to use American power 
to insure "the slow and steady improvement of mankind 
through the spread of a reformed and socially responsible
democrat ic capitalism."** These* prr.«cc?pts would curtuinlv 
affect Wilson's foreign policy towards Central America.
Upon his entry in office, Wilson sought to assuage the 
tears and suspicions of Latin Americans who had seen the 
effects of Roosevelt’s and Taft's dollar diplomacy. He 
presented his policy in a speech in Mobile, Alabama on 
October 27, 1913*
Interest sometimes separates nations, but sympathy 
unites them. Therefore one should not build foreiqn 
policy in terms of material interests. I want to take 
this occasion to say that the United States will never 
again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest 
...We dare not turn from the principle that morality and 
not expediency is the thing that guides us, and that we 
will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient 
to do so.**
Wilson began by denouncing imperialism and the dollar 
diplomacy and intervention of his predecessors. But as Or. 
Arthur S. Link commented!
The years from 1913 to 1921 witnessed intervention 
by the State Department and U.S Navy on a scale 
that had never before been contemplated, even by 
such alleged imperialists as Theodore Roosevelt 
and William Howard Taft.**
Wilson's interventions into Central Amer*. ca would also 
contribute to the increased protection of the North 
American investors. His Secretary of State William Jennings
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Bryan would b*- proud to bu us-iociaU'd i^irh ,, pr.?*iOi»m who 
had “opened ^he doors of all the weaker conntr if-s to an 
invasion of American capital and American ent c?rpr i s*. ,,,s' 
When Germany demonstrated its desire to extend investments 
in Haiti, Wilson warned the h'aiser:
Certain sorts of concessions granted to. 
governments in America to fiuropean financiers 
and contractors...might lead to measures which 
would imperil the political independence, or at 
least the complete political autonomy ot the 
American states involved.**
Thus one of the Wilson administrations contributions to 
the increased protection of North American investors was 
the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to European financial 
as well as political and military intervention.** Calvin 
Coolidoe's remark in April 1925 to the United Press further 
resounded the theme for the 1920's. He said that North 
Americans and their propertv “are a part of the general 
domain of the nation, even when abroad.,.There is a 
distinct and binding obligation on the part of 
self-respecting governments to afford protection to the 
persons and property of their citizens, wherever they 
toe.“*° Since the time of Theodore Roosevelt it was 
abundantly clear to the economic and politic#! elites of 
Latin America that the U.S was quite willing to enforce the 
Latin American's economic dependence with direct political 
and military intervention. One Latin American leader who
recognized i.hic r e a l l t / and accepted it w6’i Gh «i t • •ina J an
leader Jorge Ubico.
By the 1930's. the period of Jorge Ubico’* 
dictatorship, the largest share of foreign investment in 
Guatemala came from the United States. The North American 
prefered direct investment as oppo-iud to e tending loans. 
Hence, most of the United States involvement in Guatemala 
was conducted throuqh large multinational corporatians or 
through direct ownership of domestically incorporated 
firms. In this manner, the North American presence wan much 
more visible that that of German and British capital. In 
their preference for certain sectors of the economy. North 
American capital would invest in key areas where it was 
crucial, but it also resulted in North American domination 
of pivotal portions of the economyi transportation, 
communications and public uti1ities.41
The United Fruit Company constituted the largest 
foreign or domestic enterprise in Guatemala, and relations 
with this huge firm, called "El Pulpo" (the Octupus) were 
of critical importance to the economy especially during the 
Ubico period.4” Previously with Guatemala solely dependent 
on coffee exports Ubico had ruled the country tor the 
coffee oligarchs between 1931 and 1944.43 For reasons 
mentioned earlier, Ubico and other Guatemalans looked 
favorably on the German influence concentrated in 
agriculture. Yet in this major economic sector, United 
States coffee purchases slowly c.ertook Germany’s between
• 16*^
1934 *nd 1936, and by 1939 outranked tier m«nv ' «s h,«rf. a*» 
percent to 15 percent.44 And wifh World W «r II Guatemala, 
under American pressure, expropriated the lands of bennan 
coffee barons and the economy was dominated by United Fruit 
as banana prices re-covered faster than coffee prices from 
the Great Depression as the U.S marl et and the UFCO became 
more important to the Guatemalan treasury.48
UFCO was the exclusive marleter and virtually the sole 
producer of Guatemala's banana crop which qreat1y expanded, 
/hough still second to coffee, the ratio of banana to 
coffee income changed from 1 to 9 in 1930, to 1 to 3.3 in 
1932. Guatemalans viewed this change with favor since it 
seemed to be an opportunity to break the nation's complete 
dependence on coffee exports. At least dependence on two 
crops was better than total dependence on one. In addition, 
the two crops grew in different climates and were 
cultivated in different parts of the republic. Bananas 
opened up previously unproductive jungle lands.4* Through 
the Farquhar Contract that Minor Keiti. had obtained, UFCO 
controlled the wharfs in the principal ports and owned 
considerable railroad track an its lands as well as through 
IRCA now its subsidiary.4* In the mid 1930's UFCO had 
gained control of IRCA. At this time they had considered 
building a port on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala in order 
to ship its west coast bananas. A new west coast port would 
compete with IRCA who at this time had some financial 
problems. UFCO decided not to build the port and aid the
percent of the rairoad's stock.*• In this manner UFCO 
controlled virtually all the track in the republic and the 
transport of bananas to market could come before any other 
cargo. As author Kenneth Grieb points out, while the 
corporation only constructed extractive rniIroads and port 
facilities where they served its own plantations and 
enterprises, they were the only entity willing to invest 
capital in railroads and ports in Central America. At least 
they provided some sort of rudimentary transportation. 
Since UFCO through its "Great White Fleet" also provided 
the principal service to the nation*s Gulf ports, they thus 
controlled much of Guatemala's access to other nations.
From 1936 to 1937 Ubico consolidated UFCO's
concessions. After expropriating Guatemala's electric
enterprise from its German owners, he turned it. over to 
UFCO. In 1906 the Company had been granted 170,000 acres of 
the most productive land, Ubico extended their holdings 
until they controlled 42 percent of Guatemala’s lands. In 
addition, UFCO was exempt form all taxes and import
duties.00 A UFCO subsidiary Tropical Radio and Telegraph 
dominated the communications field. mt Ubico attracted 
other North American firms to the Republic. He felt that 
establishing ties with the hemishperes greatest power and 
world financial center would benefit Guatemala as its 
proximity to the U.S offered trade advantages that could 
serve to stimulate the country's export s e c t o r . O t h e r
r a i l r o a d -  In r e t u r n  t o r  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n c e *  thc*v r e c e i  44
North American firms would ' ontroJ r,rn*.r  ^ ot
international transpor t at i on: W.K Gr.ice anil Companv, the
Panama Mail Steamship Companv and Pan American Airways. 
The only other communications firm providing internat1 onal 
service was All American Cetb1*3®. The First Nat lonai City 
Bank o f  New York operated a branch in Guatemala i.itv that 
was one of the largest banks in th#» nation. Thf? largest 
department store in the capital, Fnsi?nth..«l lujos and 
virtually all the principal firms in the field at public 
utilities were in North American hands. North American 
capital was also present in finance, retailing, and mineral 
extract!on.•"
Yet since UFCO was by far the largest foreign 
enterprise in the country and indeed in Central America and 
the Caribbean, their influence was most keenly felt. As 
their financial and technical resources vastly exceeded any 
of the area's governments they were virtually the only 
source of sizeable external investment and any threat to 
take its capital and resources of a country with a more 
pliant government, was most serious."4 It is this arquement 
that Kenneth Grieb uses tn explain why Ubico allowed the 
growing foreign control of Guatemala's economy. According 
to him, foreign governments, corporations and financiers 
were Ubico's only potential source of external capital for 
his development objectives - and they were essential given 
the inadequate internal capital and technical resources. 
Ubico and his advisers welcomed North American firms and
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“placed a higher v <lue on securing ii. * t men r wirn it'- long 
range impact on the domestic economy, rather tf:»n uoun ♦ ho 
technicalities ot the transactions; the-, were det or mi nod to 
attract investment through liberal r igid adherence
to ( ontractual ot pulatinns n m i H  ■•! J honitat
id/rn 11 * str \t \ on , aft through t r fHill t n r I • if. , < o 1 ab 1 ©
qr vernment under wh iCii LQinpann?1; ( uulcl function
t+ t @c t w f  i v . Ca 1 von the Depression and the:- pauc: i t „ ot t i rms 
willing to invest capital in Central nmeric.i. this policy 
wan entirely u n d e r s t a n d a b 1e ." ®" Other Guatemalans were nut 
quite so cinder standing and in 1744 Ubico was overthrown by 
a coalition at independent businessmen, intellectuals and 
military career 1 sts.m+ The reality ot the new government in 
Buatemala and the emergence ot the United states from World 
War II as an undisputed world power would determine the 
political and economic climate for investment afler 1954.
America is the dynamic center of ever-wideninq 
spheres of enterprise, America as the training 
center of the skillful servants of mankind, 
America as the Good Samaritan, really believing 
again that it is more blessed to give than to 
receive, and America as the powerhouse of the 
ideals of Freedom and Justice - out of these 
elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 
20th Century to which we can and will devote 
ourselves m  jcy and gladness and vigor and 
enthusiasm. It is in this spirit that all of us 
are called, each to his own measure of capacity, 
and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to 
create the first great American Century.
Henry R. Luce. <1V4 t >
C h a p t e r  2 . THE AMERICAN CENTURY
Sing a song of quetzals, poet et% 
full of peace'
The junta’s in the Palace, they’ve taken 
out a lease.
The commies are in hiding, just across the 
street!
To the embassy of Mexico they beat a quick 
retreat.
And pistol packing Peuri fay looks mightv 
opti mi Stic
For the land of Guatemala is no longer 
Communist i c !
Betty Jane Peurifoy
In the 1940"s the United States emerged tram World war 
II wrapped the glory of the "American Century" committed to 
exercise its new found world status. They had recovered 
from the depression and carefully nurtured an incredible 
economy in a boom of wartime production, monopolized the 
atomic bomb and with its clear supremacy in the air and on 
the seas they stood unchallenged as the most powerful 
nation in h i s t o r y . 4
Guatemala emerged from the 1940's further locked into a 
two crop economy. In 1949 coffee accounted for about 72 
percent of the total value of exports while bananas 
represented about 14 percent of all exports on the basis of 
customs receipts.* In addition, the bulk of these exports 
were destined for the United States. (4hile in 1938 the 
value of Guatemalam exports to the U.S had amounted to 69.5 
percent of the total, in 1948 this figure would reach 92 
percent. A further reinforcement of these ties to the 
United States, was that in 1949 73 percent of Guatemalan 
imports came from the U.S.3
During the early postwar years officials in Washington 
preoccupied themselves with the now dependent nations in 
Europe and Asia and much to the dismay of the Latin 
Americans, Central and South America ranked far down on the 
list of priorities.* For Latin Americans, this 
concentration on European reconstruct!on signified the 
emergence of an East-West Cold War that they were
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i ncr easi ngl / forced to participate m  s r < price* tor jin . 
aid -^ t all. * This Mould bring an end to the "boot* N»j i** rib or 
Policy" of the Konsevslt years. L ^ t u r , as deitionstra* e<1 in 
the Truman a d m i m  stration, interest was focused on what was 
seen as the growth of communism ,<nd nationalism m  Latin 
America. '■■■/ the mid 1^5'i's, ear 1 i nr or t»*nt jtion toward 
Europe had shifted and United States aid programs would 
concentrate on U.S security objectives and on assisting the 
well being of U.S private enterprise bv fostering private 
U.S direct investment in less-developed countries.4' from 
1950 to I96u over half of the total long term investment 
*as m  this form and the value of U.S direct investment 
rose by over 80 percent from U.S$4,400 million to US$8,400 
mill ion.T The new world economic policv that developed 
during this time would be challenged by G u a t e m a l a ’s new 
rulers after 1944 and the p o l i c y ’s ultimate success in 19!:»4 
would shape the political anc! economic climate tor
investment in that country.
THE GOOD NEIGHBOR
No nations in the Morld were more dependent on the 
United States than the five countries in Central America.* 
&ut it m «s with great optimism that the "coffee and banana 
republics11 viewed the first few years after 1945, for they 
felt that this status might change.
At the start of the war in 1939, officials in
Hashington worked out some agreements in order to insure 
access to Central American foods and raw materials. Once
they had opposed anything of the sort, but now they even 
accepted purchasing quotas on coffee ( although they were 
suspended as soon as the war ended ). Hence coffee growers 
and others enjoyed a semblance of assured markets and 
stable? and low prices, and watched the dollars pour i n t o  
Latin America. Although partly out of patriotism and partly 
out of intense U.S pressure, these producers of raw 
materials accepted prices below those o r  the mar l e t , the 
balance of trade turned favorable.* But Latin Americans 
accepted this relationship hoping that after the war 
Washington would show its appreciation with a stream of 
goods and investment. The Central Americans suffered 
especially when the Roosevelt administrat 1 on crushed these 
ideas by moving to develop a postwar policy that was global 
not regional. Political stability was expected whether if 
was enforced b y  a dictator or a more "democratic" 
government. As available resources went to other nations 
considered to be most important for U.S security and trade, 
little or no economic aid went to Latin America after the 
war . 10 So by 1949 the US43.4 billion Latin America had 
accumulated by selling raw materials to the United States 
had dwindled away. And the Latin Americans had little or no 
development to show for it. They had cooperated during the 
war in the faith that later they would receive their "fair- 
share of capital and goods" . 1 1
The idea of foreign aid had come through Roosevelt*s 
New Deal. When they realized that trade expansion was hat
possible unles* foreign nations possessed or could ac«iuir<? 
funds to buy American goods Congress created the 
E;;port-Import Bank to loan dollars for purchase* of 
American goods abroad. 12 Soon the Roosevelt admi n 1 s tr* at i on 
decided that perhaps a multilateral approach would be more 
economically efficient, and neutralise anti American 
sentiment. Their first efforts at this were the proposal 
for the Inter-Amer 1 can Banl' and the lnt<?r-Amer i can 
Development Commission (IADC) that was established with 
Nelson Rockefeller as chairman . 15 This approach to 
mult 1 1aterali §m meant that Latin Americans would need 
supervision in the disposal of U.S funds but also in the 
disposal of their own funds. For under U.S guidance, 
economic development would be channelled into areas 
complementary < not competitive with ) with existing U.S 
industries. Under these terms Latin American* would be 
given a s h a r e . F o r  as Roosevelt said in I940i "Give them 
a share, they think they are just as good as we are. and 
many of them are."1* In this spirit, development loans 
became part of U.S economic foreign policy.**
THE E S C / M T C0LD
From the United itatpa* preoccupation with European
reconstruct ion eipfppp an eaeai ating Bast -M a t  Cold War. 
The feeling at th# M O P  Nip that the feared link up of 
Latin America with communism could be prevented by a more 
direct and cheaper program of milikmrv aid. At the end ©f 
1948 dictatorships in Reru and Mehetupla became early
l«Ma
- J4~
recipients of 1arQe-scaie U.S military aid. ©»«t after 
the reformist-national ist government of Juan Jos>e Mr^val o 
m  Guatemala received no aid at all.1* The Truman 
administration continued in this vein by ipnnsonnq the 
Mutual Security Act of 1931 which resulted m  a buildup of 
military assistance to Latin America from $2uu,00u in 
fiscal 1952 to several millions in fiscal 1953. The 
economic dimension of this military aid was demonstrated by 
a provision whereby the Latins agreed to limit trade with 
Soviet bloc countries.4* As far as the nature of the U.S 
governments aid shift towards protecting and encouraging 
private investment, Truman proposed his Point Pour Program 
which projected a benevolent exportation of American 
technological know-how. He offered to include an investment 
guaranty clause in this . 2 '*1 The Eisenhower admini stration 
would take proposals siOi as this and buildup the American 
position of vanguard against communist encroachment of the 
free enterprise system. The event that singularly would 
manifest this policy was the admini stration •’ s backing of 
the Guatemalan coup in 1954 that toppled the democratically 
elected government of Jacobo Arbenz. Before discussing the 
particular climate established in Guatemala after 1954. one 
must understand the events in this country that led the 
Eisenhower administration to take such steps.
THE "REVOLUTIONARY" GOVERNMENT OF ARBENZ
I have discussed the tendency of each administration 
since the beginning of the twentieth century to view
tor ic*nCentral America as a region fcn be l opt "f j k 1" 
corporations. Obviously not all Central Americans shared 
this view. Their feelings of bitterness towards one 
company, the United Fruit Company ( UFCU ) are oppressed by 
Alfonso Bauer Pair, Minister of Labor and kconomy under 
Arbenz•
All the achievements of the Company were made at the 
expense of the impoverishment of the country and by 
acquisitive practices. To protect its authority it h d 
to recourse to every methods political intervent1 on, 
economic compulsion, contractual imposition, bribery 
and tenditious propaganda as suited its purposes of 
domination. The United Fruit Company is the principal 
enemy of the progress of Guatemala* of its democracy 
and of every effort directed at its economic liberation. 
The United Fruit Company had indeed prospered in 
Guatemala. Between 1942 and 1952 the company increased its 
assets by 133.8 percent and paid stockholders nearly 62 
cents for every dollar invested. The company's public 
relations consultant* Edward Bernays recalled that it was a 
highly profitable venture largely because "the company was 
conducted like a private governmentM•** Thomas McCann, who 
worked for United Fruit for many years and then wrote a 
book about it* observed! "Guatemala was chosen as the site 
for the Company's earliest development activities at the 
turn of the century because a good portion of the country 
contained prime banana land and also because at the time we
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@nt t*cJ Central Hinpr ; c 1 • Guatic-ma 1 v. * -z govor rjinen* w.«§ the 
region’s weakest, most corrupt and most plinhle. tn short, 
the country ottered an 'ideal investment c l im^te', and 
United Fruit's protits there flourished 4 or tittv year©. 
Then something went wrongs a man named ‘Jacob Arbenz became 
president."*3
Since the overthrow ot IJbico in 1 V44, the tone ot the 
Guatemalan government had changed. With the election of 
Arbenz UFCO toresaw that idealistic generalit 1 es could give 
way to action.** Arbenz outlined his goals in his inaugural 
addressi
Our government proposes to begin the march toward th# 
economic development of Guatemala, and proposes three 
fundamental objectives! to convert our country from a 
dependent nation with a semi-colon!al society to an 
economically independent country: to convert Guatemala 
from a backward country with * predominantly feudal 
economy into a modern capitalist state and to make this 
transformation in a way that will raise the standard of 
living of the great mass of our people to the highest 
level...Our economic policy must necessarily be based 
on strengthening private initiative and developing 
Guatemalan capital, in whose hands rest the fundamental 
economic activity of the country...Foreign capital will 
always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local 
conditions, remains always subordinate to Guatemalan 
laws, cooperates with the economic development of the
• ? .7 -
countr> , and strict! / e»bit..ans from interypninw in the* 
nation's soc i a l  and political 1ife. . . Agar 1 an reform is 
a vital part ot our program so that we can rid 
ourselves of the 1 atifundi os...and introduce 
fundamental changes in our primitive worl methods, that 
is, to cultivate uncultivated lands and those* lands 
where feudal customs are maintained incorporating 
science and agricultural technology* **
Several of Arbenz's goals would conflict directly with 
the interests of UFCO. He announced a priority of building 
a highway to the Atlantic in order to end IRCA/UFCQ* s grip 
on the nation's foreign trade) he unveiled plans to build 
an electric power plant which would free Guatemala from 
reliance on the Amencan-owned facility which at the time 
was the only major generating outlet in the country.** 
Having received many privileges form the Guatemalan 
government since the early 1900*s, UFCO’s officials were 
shocked in October of 1951 by Arbenz*s refusal to extend 
UFCO's labor contract until the company pledged to respect 
the lews and constitution of Guatemala and accept the 
government as ths final arbitsr in any disputes between 
labor and management* In addition he proposed that the 
docks *t Puerto barrios be improved, that rail freight 
rates be reduced, that UFCO begin paying export duties and 
that the company consider paying compensation for the 
"exhaustion '1 of Guatemalan land.** These demands were not 
fomented by communist infi 1 trators, in fact, many of them
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such as - qovpr-mnpiit regulation of ♦?nerg . CijfnpcniMs arid 
establishment cf an autonomous National Power Authority; 
wages that, tool into account the general price level’; 
regulation of foreign businesses; industr 1 alization to 
lessen reliance on foreign trade; a capital gains ta:; and 
public spending projects m  transportation, communications, 
warehousing, education and health care - were recommended 
in a report on the economic development of Guatemala by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development < 
World Bank ) issued in 1951,**
As Arbenz assumed office, the IBRD in their report made 
observations and conclusions in response to the way IJFCQ 
had done business in Guatemala They remarked that recently 
Mthe activities of the Government in fostering more 
progressive social and economic conditions have sometimes 
created and impression that legitimate prof i t-seeking 
enterprise is not looked upon with favor. The impression is 
very largely psychological. ** In fact, the authors of this 
“Mission to Guatemala*1 suggested a review of the status of 
UFCO’s relationship with Guatemala, much as Arbenz had.
It is the view of the Mission that if a few obvious 
adjustments can be made, both in the general attitude 
toward foreign investment and in some of the positive 
aspects governing it, the way might be paved for a 
successful revision of the legal status governing 
activities of* the United Fruit Company and the Inter­
national Railways of Central America in Guatemala. The
- 2 9 -
basic philosophy o* thn p , * n t rontri*« t- with the 
Internationa1 fvai i way? nf Central America, c.-included in 
1923 and running until the v»ar 20u9, do* • . not appear 
f undament a .1 1 y different from that of the first 
concession granted by the admi m  ^ tr at i or o + General 
Barrios as ear 1 v ^  1877. The original contract with 
the United Fruit Company was concluded i n 1 9 m t . These 
dates by themselves illustrate* th#» outmoded character 
of these agreements.
The report also observed that
...foreign companies should refrain from any direct or 
indirect political activity against the Government; and 
they should accept, perhaps less reservedly than they 
have thus far done, the need to adapt, their legal 
status and their operations to changed conditions. Buch 
a change in attitude would appear to be a prerequisite 
to more positive measures towards constructive 
cooperation.”**
To be sure, the proposals of Arbenz and the IBRD would 
upset UFCO's traditional business practices. But none would 
be quite so threatening as the Decree 9o0, the agrarian 
reform act of June 27, 1912. According to Walter haFeber 
ihd U.9 State Department realized as early as 1930 that U.S 
economic poidtr, was being challenged by Guatemalans who 
defined the confrontation as being over who was to 
determine the future use of their own property. **
THE DECREE 9*>0
F>‘psi d#nt of a country where? some 9u percent o? the? 
workers were rural Arben.: considered Mie passage of an 
agrar; an reform 1 aw to be a priority. The provisions of the 
bill. Decree 900, enacted on June J 7, 1951' empowere?d the
government to:
...expropriate only uncultivated portions of 1 arge 
plantations. Farms smaller than 21?3 a> res were not 
subject to the law under any circumstanco*, nor were 
farms of 223 to 670 acres which were at lea* t two 
thirds cultivated. Farms of anv sire that were fully 
worked were likewise protected against sewure. All 
lands taken were to be paid for in 25 year bonds issued 
by the government bearing a Z7, interest rate, the 
valuation of the land was to be determined from its 
declared taxable worth as of Hay 1951 a provision 
that deeply disturbed some targets of the law, 
especially United Fruit, which had undervalued its Land 
tor years in order to reduce its tax liability The 
complicated lands and the vast "national farms" already 
in public hands as a result of the national*- oation of 
Berman property in the previous decade would be
distributed to landless peasants in plots not to exceed 
42.5 acres each. Most of those receiving the land would 
hold it for their lives only, and would not be given 
legal title to it as i way of preventing speculation 
arid resale of the land. They would pay a rental fee
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equi valent to 5 percent at th»? v»lue (it the? rood 
produced in the cise of e preprinted private land and 3 
percent in the case o* 'national tar me," ♦ al <?n earlier 
from the Qtnuins.
v^v,pr * period ©t lh months that the land r^torm program 
was i n operation, about 1 ‘X , U 0<> tam. lies received e, total 
ot *8,343,545 in bond*. In all, 107 "national farms" and l‘> 
percent of the nation's fallen land *er * distributed and 46 
farms given to peasant* organised in cooperati ves. '*** fhomas 
McCann, a former executive of UFCO commented later that in 
1953 only 139,000 acre* of the company's 3 million acre* 
were actually planted in banana*. The re*t was held by the 
company to assure in part that the competition would not be 
able to utilise the land.3* The implementation of the 
agrarian reform law did not go smoothly in all aspects. 
Peasant* either anxious for nor# land, or those waiting for 
farms for which they had applied, or even some of hostile 
toward arrogant or frightened landowners began to seize 
farms which they were not legally entitled. Leftist* and 
radicals determined to increase the revolutionary pace 
encouraged these takeovers and Arbenz did not respond to 
these actions with the severity that the situation 
demanded.**
Now did United Fruit Company fare under Decree 900? In 
March 1953 two separate decrees expropriated 209,842 acres 
of uncultivated land on the Tisquisate plantation in the 
lush Escuintla area near the Pacific.** The government
offered $627,5-’l' in bond':> ■ *2.9? per t,cre ttr land th.«fr J>» 
years earlier h«ad been purchased for *1.48 per acre ) based 
on UFCO’s declared ta>; value of the land. In October 1953 
and February 1954 the government ordered 2 more 
e>:propr 1 ations of uncultivated UFCO lands on the Atlantic 
coast. For these new tat'covers Guatemala offered to pay 
$500,000. On April 20, 1954, the U.S State Department, not 
UFCO, delivered a formal complaint demanding $15,854,849 in 
compensation ( ever *75 per acre ).** At this time a series 
of crucial meetings in Washington called at the urging of 
UFCO and its supporters in the government considered how to 
end the process which had led Guatemala to take these 
actions . * 0 Indeed, within weeks after the expropriations 
appeared to be inevitable, Eisenhower ordered the CIA to 
plan a counterrevolutlon . * 1
Although the reason given for the U.S supported 
counterrevoi ution that came in 1954 was Guatemala’s 
importation of Soviet bloc weapons, this would seem to 
disregard the previous seven years of increasing 
confrontation between the Guatemalan government and the U.S 
government over such issues as private property. Vet 
another simplification would be asserting that the United 
States designed the military intervention to merely save 
the property of United Fruit. The U.S government saw the 
UFCO vs. Guatemala problem to be a crucial bit of evidence 
that proved that Arbenz was coming under communist 
influence. Even as late as April 1954, that evidence could
n o t  r e s t  on G u a t e m a l a •s»uppiirt ot  i n t ( ? r n d t i o n a l < ommunism
there was no proof of that - rather on its treatment of 
private property m  the country.*a
Many studies have been made of the 1954 
counterrevolution in Guatemala, and so the objective of 
this paper is not to attempt to shed new light on the 
matter. Rather the events in the late fourties and early 
fifties in Guatemala are of interest because they made 
Guatemala a ’’good place to do business".
The 1950's ushered in a "new world economic policy" for 
the Uniteo States. Prior to 1954, the dispute between 
Guatemala and the U.S had centered around Guatemala's 
inclination to establish some kind of control over private 
property, especially that owned by foreigners. Perhaps the 
events of 1954 encouraged eight Latin American nations in 
1955 to sign treaties permitting the U.S government to take 
over private claims in the event of dispute . * 3 During the 
Eisenhower administration popular governments were 
overthrown on three continents. He pursued means by which 
to ensure America’s dominance in the race against the 
Soviet Union and in the race to secure access to the 
world’s resources and markets. To Eisenhower and his 
associates that was a committment to a free market economy 
and they spoke of new worlds to liberate not of maximizing 
profit. Others called it empire.** Others such as author 
Blanche Wiesen Cook in her book Thy Declassified 
Eisenhower. were sharply critical.
h  GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
rhe initial focus of Eisenhower s program was 
international trade for security and private profit. 
Joint-business-government that in the past had been just 
spoken of, was realized in an ambitious series of trade 
missions to sell American goods and values abroad.** 
Certain comments made in addresses during his term bespeak 
of this focus.
On March 30, 1934 Eisenhower addressed Congress to
introduce the new foreign economic program and spoke of 
specific measures to further the government-private 
enterprise partnership.
The national interest in the field of foreign economic 
policy is clear. It is to obtain...the highest possible 
level of trade and the most efficient use of capital 
resources. " He then detailed America's new tax supports 
to encourage the "flow of private investment abroad": 
"Taxation of business income from foreign subsidiaries 
at a rate of 14 percentage points lower than the 
regular corporate rate"|"broadening the definition of 
foreign taxes which may be credited against the U.S 
income tax" ...removal of "the overall limitations on 
foreign tax credits..." There would, of course, be 
"full diplomatic support to promote the acceptance and 
understanding of by other nations of the prerequisi ten 
for the attraction of private foreign investment.** 
Probably after the counterrevolution in Guatemala in
1954, other nations could infer how crucial their treatment 
of private investment was to their relationship with the 
U.S government* Blanche Wiesen Look in her book itie 
Declassified Eisenhower delivers scathing criticism ot this 
new world economic policy. In her opinion, “Eisenhower 
helped to begin the process of undermining America's 
economic integrity and transforming the world economic 
system. To preserve free enterprise gunboat diplomacy has 
been globalized . " 47 In reference to the coup of 1954 in 
Guatemala she states that countennsurgencv "was to be an 
interim policy that wou.d continue to ensure and acceptable 
political climate for private investment expansion 
overseas. It was not meant to he an end in itself. The goal 
of the American Century was not9 after all, to establish 
tyrannical and repressive regimes abroad while destroying 
the domestic economy of the United States. It was to 
promote the American way of life throughout the world. The 
American Centurv would end peonage and suffering. It would 
thereby eliminate interest in communism and insure a global 
marketplace for American goods and services.“*•
To be sure Washington continued to support ths U.S 
private stakes abroad, but in the late 1950’s and 1960’s 
U.S policies sought to foster private U.S direct investment 
in less developed and not developed nations . 44 Emphasis on 
European reconstruction had shifted. In 1960 Eisenhower 
spoko of this new government policy!
It private U.S firms 90 to the developed countries, it 
is because they see a profitable mar let there which can 
only be reached by going there...In the case of the 
lesser developed countries there is and urgent need, 
not to retard the input of new private capital from the 
U.S. but vastly to expand it. This is the best way to 
counter the communist economic offensive. to guard 
against expropr 1 ations and state ownership and to 
provide private jobs for the growing populations of 
those regions. . . 8,0
The views of the United States International Chamber of 
Commerce ( U.S-ICC ) and businessmen such as Nelson 
Rockefeller also spoke of a global development through the 
free market economy. Free trade was the link between free 
enterprise and the free world. Free trade required an 
appropriate investment climates stable international 
relations, agreeable allies, respectful clients. In this 
manner the government could be of service to the organized 
business community . " 1
Accorv .ng to the U.S-ICC, private capital should not be 
asked to risk its profits in the dangers of statism and 
upheaval. Inducements would include ta:: incentives, 
dramatic changes in U.S antitrust laws, "guarantees'* 
against "the risk of loss as a result of civil strife, or 
confiscation." "The United States government might allow, 
for tax purposes, a very rapid depreciation of foreign 
plants owned by U.S nationals. The United States government
toreion mvtstffipnti.might extend loans for private
repayments to be dependent upon profits."®*
Nelson Rockefeller spoke of a new partnership between 
business and capital. "The United States government can
make international agreements, loan funds and cooperate in 
innumerable ways." But the government "cannot go abroad and 
develop the production of goods and services." It seemed to 
him "almost preposterous for a private group to enter this 
field" unprotected. His "ultimate hope" was that "our 
government" would "recognize the importance" of 
international economic development . * 9 Here again Cook is 
sharply critical. "The creation of a system whereby the
state would expend billions of dollars each year to
protecty ensure, coddle and promote private interest tor 
strictly private profit organized into vast merger 
monopolies and international cartels which were boldly 
expanded in the postwar world. Nobody named it imperialism. 
Nobody named it at all. For years it was shrouded in 
cliche, drapped modestly in the mystique of free 
enterprise."•*
THE EMPIRE
The establishment of the U.S as the dominant world 
>~?ower after World War II and the new world economic policy 
would lead others to apeak of an empire.
In March 19SB Adlai Stevenson extolled the virtues of 
the new policy at the National Conference of Organizations
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on International Trade Policy*
We are *.he worl *s create* traders... The sun never sets 
on the American business empire. An empire without a 
capital, colony, or ruler, it flourishes everywhere 
because it renders its customers greater satisfactions 
at lower cost than they can rc?cei /e elsewhere.. • Our 
foreign trade looms over the world. Last year the 
combined value of exports, imports and overseas 
manufacturing reached the staggerino total of $67 
b i 1 1 i e n •.. ••
Others like Cool- would lament this "rising" of the 
transnational American business empire * one without a flag 
or loyalty, Clarence Randall, Eisenhower's special 
consultant on foreign economy policy presented a less 
dramatic assessment before the 59th Annual Congress of 
American Industry sponsored by the National Association of 
Manu f ac t ur er s .
The entire world must buy American products but the 
others have nothing with which to balance their trade 
budget. Trade must be two way.••outward flow of 
American private investment into the underdeveleped 
parts of the world would result in gain under the 
incentive system. Private American capital must do it 
because we will make more money than by investment in 
the United States.11*
The problem was how to bring about an increase in world
trade and offer hope of a steadily rising volume of
on International Trade Policy*
We are the world's greates traders...The sun never sets 
on the American business empire. An empire without a 
capital, colony, or ruler, it flourishes everywhere 
because it renders its customers greater satisfactions 
at lower cost than they can receive elsewhere...Our 
foreign trade looms over the world. Last year the 
combined value of exports, imports and overseas 
manufacturing reached the staggering total of 467 
billion... *•
Others like Cook would lament this "rising" of the 
transnational American business empire - one without a flag 
or loyalty. Clarence Randall, Eisenhower’s special 
consultant on foreign economy policy presented a less 
dramatic assessment before the 59th Annual Congress of 
American Industry sponsored by the National Association of 
Manufacturers.
The entire world must buy American products but the 
others have nothing with which to balance their trade 
budget. Trade must be two way.••outward flow of 
American private investment into the underdeveloped 
parts of the world would result in gain under the 
incentive system. Private American capital must do it 
because we will make more money than by investment in 
the United States.**
The problem was how to bring about an increase in world
trade and offer hope of a steadily rising volume of
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production in the world. Randall urged his audience to 
support Eisenhower"* program not for political reasons 
only, but for personal gain also.
Each of the preceding views expressed at least agreed 
on the point that United States business expansion would 
alter the nature of government and business relations. The 
coup of 1954 had certain ramitications for foreign
investment. First it seems to have assured both private 
investors and Guatemalans that the U.S would support 
investments and investors outside of the U.S. As seen 
above, specific programs wero undertaken to encourage 
further U.S business expansion and promotion of the 
American way. In Guatemala, these aims of the new world 
economic policy appeared to encourage the marked increase 
in foreign investment in Guatemala after 1954.
Chapter IN SEARCH OF MUTUAL PROSPERITY
What we are proposing will not adversely affect 
the United States. It will benefit future 
generations, since with a developed Latin America 
the United States will have more commerce ... i f we 
solve the economic problems now, we will lay the 
base for a humanist democracy in the future.
Fidel Castro.(1959)
The U.S-backed coup of 1954 m  Guatemala abruptly 
changed the direction that that country had talen in 1944 
when Jorge Ubico, the dictator closely identified with the 
three most powerful American companies, was overthrown. The 
new Guatemalan president. Colonel Carlas Castillo Armas 
would set a new course "more compatible" with the interests 
of the United States, that each succeeding Guatemalan 
government has maintained to this day. Beginning at this 
time in the 1950’s and through the end of the 1960's, was a 
period of expanded North American presence - both in the 
public and private sector. The "changed face" of U.S 
foreign aid could be seen in their support of multilateral 
regional institutions, and in their funding of the Central 
American Common Market and the Alliance for Progress. These 
two approaches towards encouraging economic development in 
Central America will be discussed because the growth of 
foreign investment depended upon the proper conditions 
(i.e. infrastructure) that these two U.S government 
undertakings created. U.S private direct investment in 
Guatemala appears to have grown and prospered in this good 
investment climate that the CACM and the Alliance for 
Progress helped create.
INVESTMENT AFTER 1954
Past history has demonstrated that because of the 
strategic considerations Central America has always been an
area of North American interest. However, rhe c< unir i«'fi jn
thi «s region never received c< comii per abl e amount of
development assistance from the U.S government unti1 1954
when fears of a left wing government in Central America 
heightened by the Cold War led to the toppling of the 
Arbenz regime m  Guatemala. 1 Although Arben: advocated 
reforms that would be endorsed later bv the Alliance for 
Progress, his programs received neither ideological nor 
economic support from the United States. Due to the 
pressure exerted by the United States any aid received from 
the rest of the world was too small to be significant.That 
the levels of li.S aid, and consequently foreign investment, 
increased after the coup in 1954 that secured a less 
threatening atmospht e for the U.S, is well documented by 
figures of the level of U.S aid and the observations of 
government publications immediately following the incident 
in 1954. However, as shown in Table 1. the international 
support that had been denied to Arbenz was given generously 
to hie predecessor, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, as the 
United States Congress gave the bilateral assistance 
program a blank check with the mandate to make Guatemala a 
Mshowplace for democracy".*
The figures demonstrating the level of U.S aid to 
Guatemala impulsed by this Congressional mandate, lead one 
to understand how foreign investment prospered after 1954. 
Table 1 demonstrates the sharp increase in development 
assistant* from the United States. The amount of medium and
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1 ow interest ln-uis and grants received b/ Guatemala between 
1953 and 195a is about 42 percent of the total received tor 
the 15 years from 1951 to 1966, and it is almost, double the 
amount received during the Alliance for Progress years 
<1963-1966)•3 During th^se years 57 percent of the tot 1 
assistance was given m  the form ot loans. However, from 
1955 to 1958, $81.8 million, or 81 percent of the total 
assistance, was given in grants and thus did not require 
Guatemala to make substantial contributions or demonstrate 
"self-help" (as will be discussed later, these were 
requirements for the Alliance for Progress programs). 
Despite this "support" President Castillo Armas was never 
securely in power, and he was assasinated in 1957. In a 
discussion of this bilateral assistance program to 
Guatemala, John McCamant, in his book. Development 
fts»i«t*nc» In Cfitral Antrlc*. m*ke« th» ob*#rv*tion th«t, 
" Since 1955 the United States has been giving support to 
governments in Guatemala which had no organi2ation.1 l base 
in the population. Three groups have come and gone without 
developing a political power to carry out 
reforms."*App*rently, simply making these vast sums of 
money available to the Guatemalan governments was not 
sufficient for the establishment of a democracy. Yet what 
this increased aid signified was the support of the U.S 
government for the establishment of the proper foreign
investment climate
Table 3.1
G u a t e m a l a :  D e v e l o p m e n t  A s s i s t a n c e  A u t h o r ! z a t i o n s  
( m i l l i o n s  o f  U . S  d o l l a r s )
U . S  F i s c a l  Y e a r s
S o u r c e  of A s s i s t a n c e 1951-54 1955-58 1958-62 1963-66 1951 66
M e d i u m  Interest Loa n s
Ex — Im Bank — 1.2 1 it cr 4.6 21.3
IBRD — 18.2 — 18. 4
IDB — — 5. 3 3 *  <£) 8.9
CABEI — — — iCDin 5 . 8
S U B TOTAL Oao 19.4 21.0 14.0 54.4
L o w  Interest Loans
AID — — 16.4 to. u 26. 4
IDA — — — — __
SPTF — — -j». 5 lo.a 14.3
SUBTO T A L 0.0 O•o 19.9 20. 8 4o. 7
G r a n t s
AID .6 54. 7 ' CTw  ~« • 9.8 88.6
U .N . 3 1-0 1.8 3. 6 6. 7
Other U.S 1.6 26. 1 6.9 12. 8 4 7. 4
SUBTOTAL 2.5 81.8 7 o n 26.2 142. ^
ft*********************** }*![****»****»
A L L  A S S I S T A N C E  2 .  5 1 0 1 . 2  73* 1 6 1 .  c.» j  *u. 8
C S o u r c e :  F r o m  M c C a m a n t , J o h n  F .  D e v e l  opnie^it A s s i s t  a n m  i n  Dt-ni r a l
A m e r i c a , p . 3 3 3
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For a description of Guatemala* investment climate in 
the late 1950’s, one may consult a 1956 Department of 
Commerce publication, Investment in Central America? basic 
information for Unit.d St«t«t builntwiwn. Th.». authors' 
view of the "climate tor foreign investment in Guatemala 
foilowss
A considerably greater increase in United States 
investments is expected in the future with the 
development in Guatemala since mid 195* of a more 
friendly attitude toward private foreign investment, 
and the effort that is being made with the help of the 
U.S government and international agencies to plan key 
investments in basic facilities such as highways, 
power, and credit for industry, and to effect
improvements in public administration.•. New ventures 
with mixed United States and Guatemalan capital in such 
fields as ready-mix concrete and lumber mills have 
recently been formed. Several foreign companies have 
begun petroleum exploration activities in view of the 
development of new petroleum legislation. United States 
contractors are involve*1 in public-works programs and 
the American Embassy in Guatemala City reports a 
substantial number of visits since the latter part of 
1954 by interests investigating investment 
opportunities.a
Clearly, as shown above, after 1954 there was a
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dramatic shift in U.S foreign aid. Previously foreign aid 
did no* w o l v e  the outlay of public funds as in Guatemala 
after a954. Usually U.S foreign policy initiatives were 
carried out through military intervention and the use of 
American personnel tn administer the Internal resources of 
the occupied nation (».> has been mentioned in the case of 
Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic).* But in 
Guatemala from 1955 to 1958 foreign aid meant loans and 
grants totalling $101.2 million in funds from the U.S 
government and other international agencies. This aid would 
help private investors establish themselves in the area and 
pressure would be put on Latin American governments to 
legislate the "proper investment climate". To illustrate 
this first point one can examine some of the assistance 
authorixations made to Guatemala. The first Export-Import 
Bank loan to Guatemala was announced in April 1955, and 
consisted of a $500,000 line of credit to a Guatemalan 
mining company. In August of 1955, the Ex-Im Bank 
authorized a credit of $675,000 to a United States exporter 
to finance the sale of telecommunications equipment to the 
government of Guatemala. The Inter-American Development 
Bank made its first loan to Guatemala in 1955 for $16.2 
million, for highway construction and maintenance.T These 
types of infrastructure developments are important for 
business climate, for investors are not likely to establish 
their operations in a country where it is impossible to 
efficiently and quickly get their goods to market. This
-46-
same investor’s guide refers to how a new type o+
investment, the joint venture is being accomodated and
encouraged by a ''growing tendency to enact general 
legislation that fines uniform conditions for all 
investors."• Therefore, in making Guatemala a "showpiece 
for democracy", the 4101.2 million in assistance from 1955 
to 1958 also made it a good place to do business.
The other Central American nations would see no 
increase in development assistance until the end of the 
decade after the rude shock of the Cuban revolution and 
expropriations. With a new found awareness of Latin 
American development aspirations aid programs revived with 
the United States ’1 support of the Central American Common 
Market (CACM> and Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.
According to many authors this surge in the late 1950’s 
and 1960’s of development aid was actually tailored to 
United States national requirements, for U.S policies 
tended to seek to foster private U.S direct investment in
the third world rather than in the more industrial
countries. Mira Wilkins in her book on the growth of
multinational corporations, commented on this 
transformation.
To be sure, in the 1920’s...the U.S government might 
have sent Marines to protect endangered U.S properties* 
government loans had aided U.S business abroad before 
World War II| over the years the U.S government had 
participated in diplomatic discussions on behalf of of
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U.S business and acted on claims commissions to try to 
recoup losses* the Department of Commerce had surveyed 
foreign investment opportunities. Vet the specific 
measures taken in the late 1950*s and 1960*s to promote 
private direct investment in less developed countries 
and to cope in advance with the uncertainties were 
unquestionably new...*
So, the character of foreiqn aid evolved from the days 
when military interventions implemented U.S policy in 
Central America. However, the new foreiqn aid dispersed 
public funds in countries like Guatemala, not solely so 
that these governments would spend them as they saw fit but 
also so as to "pave" the way for private foreign direct 
investment.
INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE
During this same period of time in the 1950’s, leaders 
of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica began to take steps to realise their objectives of 
economic integration. The outcome of these discussions 
would affect foreign investment. In this endeavor the 
leaders were aided by the United Nations Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA, or in Spanish, CEPAL), while the 
United States maintained an attitude of "cold indifference" 
until 1958. The significance of the analysis of the Central 
American intergration efforts in this paper results from 
the fact that this integration greatly spurred foreign 
investment in Guatemala. Before briefly discussing the
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development of this integration scheme and the involvement 
of the United States private investment, it would be useful 
to understand why these Central American countries wished 
to form a common market, the first of its kind among third 
world countries.
Enrique Delgado in his article on Central American 
Economic Integration, discussed the economic framework of 
the Central American Integration Program. These 
underdeveloped countries were convinced that the size of 
their domestic markets was a significant limitation to 
economic growth, and they sought to establish an internal 
market that allowed them to 1 )diversify production and 
reduce their extreme dependence on the exportation of a few 
primary commodities! 2 )accelerate their rates of economic 
growth in order to raise living standards and curtail 
chronic unemployment! and 3>modify or modernize their 
productive sector and exploit natural resources to greater 
advantage.*• In each of these countries the distortions 
caused by the cyclical behavior of export prices had 
sharply affected their production patterns and social 
structures. Sudden price rises for major export products 
like coffee, bananas and sugar were not fully taken 
advantage of as these price rises are unforseen and the 
domestic producers are slow to respond. Hence, the major 
part of the priee increase obtained created an increase in 
price for factors of production like land, an increase in 
the Income of the wealthy minority of landowners and
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increases in the imports of luxury items. Only a vary small 
part of the higher price for exports is exploited through 
increased fiscal revenue and through spillover into other 
sectors of the population, and private investment is 
repeatedly channeled into traditional activities like 
export-oriented agriculture.41 Hence, for Delgado and other
early supporters of Central American integration, “if
economic integration contributes to diversification of
production and to making the growth of the economy less
dependent on price fluctuations of a few export products, 
then benefits will have been achieved in terms of the 
fundamental objectives of the integration program.“** In 
the next chapter a discussion of the record of the Central 
American Common Market until 1969 will examine whether it 
was a success accor i ig to this standard of Delgado.
Although there is a vast amount of literature on the 
Central American Integration Program, for the purposes of 
this paper we will chiefly be concerned with the degree of 
direct foreign investment participation in this movement.
Basically the discussions on an integration program 
diverged into two distinct perceptions of how to achieve 
regional integration. One approach was that of ECLA and the 
other that of proponents of free trade. The conflict that 
arose between these two groups would stall the Integration 
Program in 1959. ECLA proposed as a major goal of the 
programt the establishment of the Regime of Integrated 
Industries (RII). The RII program had three basic
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objactives: 1 ) to encourage the establishment o+ industries 
of optimal size with exclusive access to the expanded 
market 2) to avoid duplication of investment and 3) to make 
industrialization reciprocally beneficial to all 
participants . 1 3 Countries like Honduras and Nicaragua with 
lesser economic potential supported this form of programmed 
and protected industrialiration. However, those countries 
(like Guatemala and El Salvador) with a broader industrial 
base preferred an unrestricted free trade zone where the 
allocation of industries would be conditioned by market 
f o r c e s . N o  agreement could be reached on this matter of 
integration industries and the future of Central American 
integration did not seem too bright. The turning point came 
when the United States expressed support for a Central 
American Common Market in 1958.
Indeed, it has been mentioned before that 1958 is 
widely acknowledged as the year in which United States 
foreign policy towards Latin America in general was visibly 
transformed. At the meeting of the OAS Committee of 21 
(OAS* Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New 
Measures for Economic Cooperation) the U.S representative 
declared that, "We have supported a free-trade area in 
Central America. We have also made it clear that we are 
prepared through the Export-Import Bank, to consider dollar 
financing required by regional industries in Latin 
America. *“ ■ According to James D. Cochrane, the favorable 
attitude of the U . 8  government toward the principle of
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Central American Integration was based on the belief that 
it would promote certain objectives of the United States 
such asi the improvement of social and economic conditions 
in the Central American nations; the unity of the Central 
American isthmus; and the liberalization and expansion of 
international trade and facilitation of the flow of 
international investment capital.** The more traditional 
aims of foreign aid »ere coupled with the desire to expand 
the markets for American goods and to encourage the growth 
of foreign investment. This reality leads one to some very 
important considerations. For example, the new 
infrestructure investments - did they improve the social 
and economic conditions in Central America or did t: my 
merely serve to prepare a system meeting the needs of 
foreign investors (energy, transportation etc.). The next 
year before the OAS Committee of 21, Undersecretary of 
State Douglas Dillon stated the following conditions under 
which the U.S would support regional integration in Latin 
America.
1) Regional market arrangements should aim at trade 
creation and increased productivity through broadening 
opportunities for competitive trade and should not 
simply be trade diverting. This means that arrangements
should provide for trade liberalization in all
commodities * not just those in which members are
competitive with non members - and that duties and
other restrictions applied by members of a regional
mar! e t  t o  non members s h o u l d not be h i g h e r  or more
restrictive after the formation of the market than 
before.
2) The arrangement should provide for a definitive 
schedule for the gradual el uni nation of virtually all 
barriers to 1 ntra-regianal trade, and this process 
should be completed within a reasonable period of time. 
The United States does not favor an arrangement that 
provides simply for regional preferences with little 
more than a vague hope of eventually creating a free 
trade regime.
3) The arrangement should be in accordance with the 
principle of ©ATT (Article XXIV) for the creation of a 
free tr ade area or customs union and should be 
submitted to GATT approval...
4) Regional trade arrangements should aim at increasing 
the degree of competition within the area. This means 
not only that virtually all commodities should be freed 
from all restrictions on intraregional trade, but that 
exclusive monopolistic privileges should not be given 
to particular industries or that there should be 
control agreements preventing competition. Not only is 
it believed that intra- regional competition will 
increaee productivity and invest- ment in the area, bet
that these conditions will also help to induce private 
investment.
5) Regional arrangements should provide not only -for 
free trade in commodities but also for free flow of 
labor and capital in response to economic forces...
6) Any regional arrangement should provide for the
financing of trade in convertible currencies. Neither 
bilateral pay- ments nor a restrictive regional 
payments scheme which involves discrimination against 
non members is Justified. from US Congress, Senate,
United and Latin A w r i e an Poliei.. M l m ciino
th«ir Economic R.l.tionm.)
Condition #4 expresses the US dis e» far the concept 
of the Integrated Industrie*. Again Goehr e ponders the 
explanation for this attitude toward the RII. itoly some
opponents truly believed that such a scheme actually
retard industrial development. But for Cochran# * i s norm 
probable that the “position of the United States tommrd 
integrated industries may reflect the attitudes v
anticipated attitudes) of U.S investors.“ *• Sev#r# j 
features of the plan could be objectionable to U.-S 
investors. Only a few industries would be granted 
integrated status and thus they would be extended
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privileges and protection not accorded to non members
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producing identical or similar products. Clearly in the 
conditions stated above the U.S is refering to exactly such 
a situation when it states objections to higher 
restrictions on non members. They were interested in having 
a full share of the benefits of the Common Market. Instead 
they advocated a complete opening up of the economies 
"...virtually all commodities should be freed from
restrictions on intraregional trade..." - and in such a
manner they maintained that productivity and investment 
would follow. How then would they ensure that all
investment would not concentrate in the more industrialized 
areas that had the advantages of experience and know-how? 
This regard for a balanced economic development had been a 
main concern of TCLA and of the integration discussions up 
until 1958i and as demonstrated above, U.S support would 
mean the restructuring of some of these earlier goals and 
the total abandonment of others. That the U.S government in 
their support of the Common Market might have been
influenced by pressures of the U.S investors cannot come as 
a surprise in light of the previously mentioned "unique" 
direction that U.S foreign policy had taken in the late 
1950’s - that of seeking to promote and protect U.S direct 
foreign investment and more importantly, prepare in advance 
for any "uncertainties" like civil war or expropriations.
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Aft®r this clarification of the U.S’ position on 
integration, the visit of Salvadorean president Lemus to 
Washington in the spring of 1959 appears to have sped up 
the integration process, as is expressed in a communique 
issued on the outcome of the meeting.
...the establishment of an economically sound system 
for the economies of the Central American republics and 
for a common market comprising those nations would be 
beneficial and would receive the support of El Salvador 
and the United States.•• The subject will receive 
continued study by the two governments with a view to 
taking appropriate action to carry on those sound plans 
already contemplated.M **
lssac Cohen Orantes comments that one should interpret 
* »ound system to be one that fulfilled the previously 
mentioned requirements of the United States. The United 
States was in better condition than any of the Central 
American nations or United Nations committee to fund the 
Common Market and solve the deadlock with foreign aid.
Observers with experience in Central American issues would
argue that H a strong ease can be made that U.S support was
a vital condition for the important decisions that speeded 
up the integration program in I960.M*°
CREATION OF THE CACM
Not much time was spent on studying the situation and 
toward the middle of 1959 Guatemala was included in
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discussions that El Salvador and Honduras had begun on 
matters pertaining to a revision of their old (1914) 
bilateral treaty on free trade. In January of 1960 the 
"Declaration of El Poy" emerged from the meeting of the 
three presidents of these countries in that border town. 
Neither Nicaragua nor Costa Rica were informed of the 
contents of these cuscussione nor of the motives of those 
involved. The integration scheme that had been discussed 
and planned throughout the i?50’s was suddenly modified 
when Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras signed a "Treaty 
of Economic Association" in February of 1960.** The signing 
of the treaty significantly changed the direction of the 
Economic Integration Program as it dashed the hopes of the 
proponents of the Regime of Integrated Industries by 
including in free trade all products from participating 
countries. In addition it virtually excluded Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica from the plan.** In December of 1960 the General 
Treaty on Economic Integration and the Constitutive
Agreement on the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CASED were signed. All the financial
assistance for the economic integration was to be channeled
through the CAME!.** Thl. C.ntr.l American fund for
economic integration received its first contribution in the 
amount of 910 million from member countries and 935 million 
from the United States.** By April 1969 the Integrated Fund 
of the Central American bank contained resources amounting 
to 9120 million, of which slightly more than SO percent
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consisted of loan* from the U.S Agency for Intarnational 
Development (AID) and the Inter-American Development Bank 
UDB), and the ra*t came from the member countries.*• The 
significance of this makeup of the funding was that the U.S 
influence could determine which integration projects would 
receive financial assistance. They might even have been 
able to favor foreign investor*s projects over those of 
local capital. ■* Nicaragua was allowed to choose between 
accepting the structure approved by the three countries or 
remaining excluded from the Integration Program. Costa Rica 
had the same alternatives and it was incorporated into the 
program two years after the signing of the general 
treaty.mr After the General Treaty for Economic Integration 
became effective* the CACM established free trade in the 
region and uniform tariff regulations for 94X of the 
customs categories. These measures were accompanied by a 
spectacular growth in interrregional trade that made many 
forget their objections to the modified scheme and silenced 
those voices of caution. The new institutional organization 
of the program was established * the Permanent Secretariat 
of the Treaty (8IECA)• The attitude of the United States 
toward the creation of the CACM was one of enthusiastic 
approval and support as exemplified by the new democratic 
administration of John F. Kennedy who proposed the Alliance 
for Progress on March 13, 1961.**
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THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS YEARS
For many, the entry of John F. Kennedy's democratic
administration signaled the real shift in foreign policy 
towards Latin America. Within sixty days after taking
office, Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, a
program that over the next ten years would pump *100
billion of U.S public and private funds into Latin American 
development.90 Some have called it a “bold new departure" 
in foreign aid, but for others the Alliance should be 
viewed in terms of the Cold War objective of arresting the 
spread of Castroism, and in terms of the mutual prosperity 
theme found among the “Good Neighbor" years of the 
1930's.90 As observed in Table 2, the average annual 
assistance to Guatemala from 1959 to 1962 amounted to *18.4 
million (the highest figure for Central America). Yet in 
terms of average annual assistance per capita, Guatemala 
ranked the lowest in the region <4.3 percent). In the later 
years of the Alliance (1963-1966) average annual assistance 
dropped to *15.2 million. This was the lowest figure for 
aid during this period, and again the average annual 
assistance per capita fell to 3.6 percent. An assessment 
of the Alliance for Progress period in Guatemala is 
especially significant for this study as Guatemala received 
a large share of U.S private and public dollars and 
experienced substantial growth in U.S private investment.
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Tab 1 a. 3. 2
Guatemala! Assistance Authorisations and tha Economy
Avaraga annual 
assi stanca G E. S H N C.R
(mi 1 lions)
1959-1962 IS. 4 12. 6 11. 9 14. 1 18.3
1963-1966 15. 2 26. 7 17. 8 26. 6 25.6
Par capita
1959-1962* 4.90 5.06 6. 10 9.35 15.20
1963-1966* 3.60 9.40 7.95 15.70 18. 10
As X of SOP
1959-1962* 1.8 2.2 3. 1 4. 1 4.0
1963-1966** 1.2 3.5 3.9 5.8 4.7
As X of gross 
invastmant
1959-1962* 17.2 16.0 23.4 31.0 22.8




1959-1962* 18.5 19.3 32.3 33.2 26.2
1963-1966* 13.3 31.8 42.0 48.5 32.0
As X of
import aarnings
1959-1962* 15.5 10.8 19.3 25.4 22.4
1963-1966* 9.6 15.0 18.8 21.2 22.6
• as X of 2960 figura
* as X of 1964 figura
G«0uatamala, E.S*E1 Salvador, H«Honduras, N*Nicaragua, 
C.R*Costa Rica.
CSourc.i From McC.rn.nt, John F. Dmvmloommnt Am.l.t.nc. in 
C n t r . l  ftmmriea. p. 453
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A1 though Fidel Castro’s victory in Cuba had dramatized 
the political crisis in Latin America, at this time an 
economic crisis of growing proportions seemed more 
critical.*1 The Alliance for Progress was Kennedy’s 
solution to a problem that had already been perceived by 
the outgoing administration. The Latin American industrial 
promotion policies (Import substitution industrialization) 
of the 1950's had a two-fold effect. First of all, it 
attracted large quantities of foreign capital as the book 
value of U.S direct private investment grew from 64.6 
billion in 1950 to 68.3 billion in 1960. This figure 
amounted to 70 percent of the U.S direct private investment 
in developing areas. Although the import substitution 
movement in Guatemala was not as strong as in other 
countries, it also sought to substitute domestically 
produced industrial products for goods that had previously 
been imported. As they needed to import capital goods and 
raw materials for the new domestic manufacturing plants, 
large debts in short-term high interest loans and suppliers 
credits became a burden.3* This rising debt was coupled 
with a severe crisis in the Latin American export sector. 
With ti.e exception of petroleum, the average prices of all 
Latin American exports fell by 18 percent in the four years 
before the Alliance. In the case of Guatemala despite the 
fall in prices, the volume of exports greatly increased and 
hence growth in GDP could be attributed to this factor. In 
I960 these three conditions, investment, debt and trade
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converged. Falling coffee prices seemed to threaten the 
political balance in Brazil, Colombia and Central America. 
Castro sympathizers began to mount guerrilla operations in 
depressed rural areas «nd so grew the fears of U.S 
investors who had seen the fate of their counterparts in 
Cuba. Recognizing the potential damage wrought on these 
economies who depended so on exports, Eisenhower in a 
departure from his adherence to the principles of free 
competition, signed the International Coffee Agreement to 
stop the sliding coffee prices.** Whan Kennedy entered 
office his response to this critical situation was the 
Alliance for Progress.
Kennedy’s plan in Narch 1961, called for channeling 
6100 billion over the following 10 years intn Latin 
American development. The U.8 would invest 620 billion of 
which 61.3 billion would consist of new private funds. The 
Latin Americans themselves were to collect and invest the 
remaining 6*0 billion from their resources and aid would be 
conditional on the enactment of taxes, land and other 
socioeconomic reforms. Kennedy envisioned an annual growth 
rate of 8.9 percent - in Quatemala after taking into 
account the population increase, the 8BP per capita from 
1989 to 1969 was 2.2%.** duatemala and the rest of the 
Central American nations would be areas of special interest 
as the CACM became a favored project of the Alliance.
Table 3 summarizes the forms and distribution of aid 
that went to all the Latin American nations that
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participated in the Alliance for Progress. AID was the 
administering agencv for economic assistqance under the 
Foreign Assistance Act during the last four years shown in 
this table (it was activated on November 4, 1961). The 
commitments made by AID and its predecessor agencies are 
shown separately for loans and grants in Table Z, The loan 
total encompasses development loans. Alliance for Progress 
loans, supporting assistance loans, and any other loans 
from AID or predecessor agency funds. The loans made by the 
Social Progress Trust Fund administered by the IDG are not 
shown. 10.3 percent of the total assistance during this 
period from 1949 to 1965, went to the Central American 
nations listed separately in the next tables. It is 
significant that substantial aid was not extended to 
Guatemala until 1955, remembering that the Arbenz 
government warn overthrown in the spring of 1954. Although 
the bulk of the funds seem to be concentrated in the period 
of 1955 to 1961, in total, until 1965 in practically every 
category Guatemala’s share of U.S aid was the largest in 
Central America! 36 percent of the total net obligations 
and loan authorizations, 52 percent of the grants and 46 
percent of the total expenditures on economic assistance
programs
Table 3,3
Assistance to 19 Latin American Republics
U.S Fiscal Year Total Loans Grants Total ExpenditureMarshal1 1949 — _
Plan 1950 — _ _
Per i od 1951 — — _
1952 19.4 - 19. 4 lO. 1
1953 20.6 _ 20.6 O'T C • vJ
1954 27.5 _ 27.5 16.7
Mutual 1955 44. 3 — 44. 3 26. 3
Security t**56 71.3 -- 71. 3 54. 1
Act 1957 78.5 12.8 65. 7 64.8
f *er i od 1958 86. 9 20.8 66 . 1 6 -3 . 3
1959 121.4 57. 3 64. 1 85. 5
196*1 99.8 32. 1 6 7.3 94 . 3
1961 -48. 1 143.9 1 04 . 2 114.0
1962 4 7-7. 3 358. 3 1 1 4 .  o 281 . 6
AID 1967 574 . I' 388. 7 145.5 322. 6
PERIOD 1964 £ <i O 508. 4 '*t>. 5 287. 1
1965 ,-X: ,A 389.-1 12 :. 3 427. 1
TOTAL ASSISTANCE 1. 91 i . 4 1 , * 2 V . H 1,8 7 u. - >
Principal repayments 
Interest collected
[Source: AID, Stat i s t i c s  and f>j . *
P r o g r a m s  A flro im s t ererl by _t he Oi§*-n*  ^ f \ (-d
* !_. » l* t i'll li iU. 1 £ t : . ..III »






' r? h i t?
uua rciiHLh: Ass i <zz arc e from nil. and cr nde
mi l i i  r<ns ot do i1ar
U .3 - i »c a1 Y»?ar Tot ci 1 Loan ~ Ur a n  t a 1 r * t
Marshal 1 1 94 ■> - - -
PI an 1 95*.) - - - -
Per d r-?5i - - -
1952 O. 2 - 0. u. 2
1953 0. 2 - 0. 2 <>.2
1954 0.2 - 0. 2 *.). 2
Mutual 1955 6. 7 - 6. 7 • M.1
Securi tv 1956 18.2 - 18.2 1 1. 7
HCt 1957 17.4 - 17.4 l 2.5
Per i od 1958 12.4 - 12.4 11.0
1959 8.5 5.4 3. 1 8.4
1960 6.3 3 • b 2. 8 9. 1
1961 20.9 7.5 13. 4 16. 2
1962 4.2 - 4. 2 . «,*:>
1963 3. 1 0. 7 2. 4 4. /
1964 5.6 *1 7*m 9 t 2.9 5 . 6
1965 7.0 3.0 2.0 4.6
TOTAL 1JO. 9 24.8 86. 1 94. 2
Principal repayment 0.8
Interest collected 1.0
CSource* AID, U.S Economic Assistance Proorams Administsrqd 
by_the Agency for International ...PftvftLoJBmgnti_i
fable 3.3b
Assistance from AID and predecessor agencic?s ^Summary*. 
U.S Fiscal Year Net Ubl i q j^ icns and Loan AuthorLnations
EL SALVADOR Total
Total Assistance 48.8 
1949-1965
Principal Repayments
































35.8 17.6 30. 3
o. 2
o . 5
T db 1 5 -j . 4
A c t u a l  U . S  M i l l  t a r  y A & s i t a n c e  t o  L a t i n  Amt_ri« \ . i . >* •
( i i i i l l i u n b  of US cJoJ 1 at' >
C o u n t r/ 1950-69 1970 1971 1972 1973 19/4 19/5 19 ’ 6 1 - 1 i 1 9 1 2 • ■
A r g e n t ln a 8 6 . 8 2 .4 17.4 15. B 12.1 2  3.0 30. 1 34.4 . Oo < > . . , i it >.4 H
Bo I i vi a 20 .9 1 . 2 1  - / 2 . 1 3 .4  6 . V 6 .5 1 1 . : 1 . ... i .
Br  a z  i 1 282. O 4. 3 11-4 21 .5 16-5 47 ./ 6 0 . / 44. . 058 . 1 H l‘ ; ; --f . < ,
Chi 1 e 108.4 2 . 0 6 . U 12.5 1 -j. 6  16.2 1  . 1 4 4 ft 4 '*
Co1ombla 85. 2 3. 9 7 .5 8 .5 lO .B  .58/ . 67 3 2 0 . / - / u . 1 - ~
COSTA RICA 1.9 # # 4 4 4 4 4 . i tf 4 H
Cuba lO. 6 # # 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Doitu n i can 20. 3 2 . 1 . v-f 1  . 1 1 . 0  1 . 6 1 . / 1 . , 1 . / i . ' <
K e P u b i
Ecuador 39. 3 2 . 0 1 . 4 . 028 4 . OU1 . 301 lo  - : . i 5. 4 i t . . 4 4
LL SALVADOR 5 .5 .246 . 59 3 . 456 .581 .833 •. 9 i . . £>24 .. 1 25 . < 2 i
UUATLHALA 14.3 2 . 0 5. 1 .712 4 .5  2 . 0 z , < > . . . . JO  . _ ' > 4 t’i ■ • *
Hal 1 1 3 - 2 # 4 4 4 4 . o 1 4 . i . 2  V 5 . 3 ' 1 . 32
HONDURAS 6 .9 . 284 . 8 / 2 . 721 .751 .609 . 9 4 .. 4 1
lie;, i c o 6  . O . 149 . 00*3 . 107 . O i l  .031 . 1 in . 1 09 . ! lu . i 1 . 1 V . 1 2 i
NICARAGUA I n . 8 1  . 1 1 . 2 . 581 1.1 .994 ' . U . ! * *•. . , % • . ‘ / - L -■
Panama 3. O .  404 . 828 . 69 1.2 .454 .51/ - A 1 1 . 2> . . i
1 ’ ar a g lia y 8. 1 . 7 8 6 . BO 3 1 . 1 .718 .021 . fci 2 5 i . .i . j  iJ' r 04 .1 -1 . (
1 et u 104. 6 1 . 9 . 77 7 . 986 .725 15.7 ^1 . ~ 21.1 1 * >. 9 . i . '/ -
Uruguay 38.8 1-7 L | 1 3. -> 1 . o 3 . 1 8 - 2 - •'* . . 9 1 - ■ • • •' . 1
Venc?z Lie3* 1 a 92. 9 . 745 8. 4 a .  2 8 .4  8 .4 1 o . / ■ 21 \ . I . . • • l « -
( I n c lu d e s  R or e  i gn Ml 1 1 tdl V S.:11 o e Eirianc i f »g t I l H , f .mil. I’ll i - . • . t . • l _ i . 1 11. •
Lf ogr a sit Del i v er i e s /t;-;pencil t ur arid lute!  i 1 ( 1 l > 1 t ct 1 111 1 i \ ::i . i • . * • ■ t11 I I I ! . • i r.!
11 .ij m  tig 1 i ogi am Del i ver 11-s E..pendi t u r e s )  .
[ S o u r c e :  S t a t i s t i c a l  Ab*A  r t ot Lat in Amor i C n t j 1 . 2 . * t - • i
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LOSING ITS WAV
Ait.houqh some? reports on the Alliance, for Proqrc-ss at 
the time were full of hope for a new era in U.S and Latin 
America foreiqn relation*, today most accounts of the 
Alliance view it as having been ineffective either from the 
standpoint of solving the previously mentioned political 
and economic crisis, or because it did not have the 
interests of Latin America at heart.
In their account of this period, The Alliance that Lpst 
its Wav. Jerome Levinson and Jucn de Unis comment on the 
Alliance's confrontation of the critical situation in Latin 
Amer i c a.
Social reform, national economic planning, and long 
term government loans got the headlines at Punta del 
Este. But behind the publicity was what amounted to a 
financial salvage operation. In the early years of the 
Alliance, a significant part of the U.S foreign aid 
funds channeled to Latin America served mainly to 
refinance debt payments to bankers..• This use of U.S 
public funds may have prevented some major Latin 
American countries from suspending foreign payments, 
but it did not add to the visible accomplishments of 
the Alliance.**
In this manner Levinson and de Onis suggest perhaps why 
Latin Americans saw little of the Alliance funds being 
translated into schools, hospitals, housing etc... Other 
authors have different explanations and view the Alliance
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as an example of the theme of mutual prosperity - " fhe 
Alliance was structured to protect p ' u s t m q  American land 
holdings and to maximize U.S exports to recipient
countries.**3* Illustrative of this are several sections of 
the Social Progress Trust Fund that administered the 
Alliance funds. Section 1.04a prohibited the use of 
American funds for the purchase of agricultural land - 
hence there was no promotion of land reform. Section 4.05 
prohibited the use of funds for purchasing in non-member 
countries. Section 4.06 stipulated that purchases must be 
made either in the recipient country or in the United 
States.3 r Given the small, restricted market of Guatemala, 
this would ensure that most of the raw materials required 
for industrial production, machinery, capital goods etc. 
would be purchased from the U.S. The Alliance's critics 
maintain that from the start then, under Kennedy, the 
thrust of the Alliance policy was to make foreign aid a 
more effective vehicle for protecting U.S investments. 
Further restrictions on aid funds aross in 1962 when 
Congress assed the Hickenlooper Amendment that provided 
for the cessation of aid to any country which expropriated 
American holdings. Again, in 1963 through a provision of 
the Foreign Assistance Act the administration agreed to cut 
off aid funds after 1965 to any country that did not agree 
to recognize the U.S government as insurance claimant for 
the private U.S investors. By 1966, most governments had 
signed such agreements.•• It appears then that many
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countries may have had to pay a pricr for this development 
aid. Kennedy’s response tn the radicalism in L ^ t m  America 
as embodied by Castro, had been the Alliance for Progress 
that m s s  to bring about democratization and structural 
change < hence the stated conditions like enactment of tax 
laws and socioeconomic reforms )| but U.S conventional and 
counterinsurgency forces were also a Key part of Kennedy's 
response to radicalism.** Walter LaFeber states that from 
1950 to 1963 Guatemala received #5.3 million in military 
assistance from the U.S. In light of this. Table 4 suggests 
that from 1963 to 1969 this type of aid reached *9 million, 
that is, it almost doubled. Again, Guatemala received the 
largest Central American portion of military assistance.
THE ALLIANCE AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
One has seen how since after WWII the United States has 
provided the majority of foreign investment in Latin 
America, and how President Kennedy specifically called on 
the private investors to be a partner in the Alliance for 
Progress. In spite of Kennedy's comments, the Charter of 
Punta del Este’s only reference to the role of foreign 
private investment is the expressed desire "to stimulate 
private enterprise in order to encourage the development of 
Latin American countries at a rate which will help them to 
provide jobs for their growing population..."*° No 
particular emphasis was placed upon foreign investment 
during the first year of the Alliance. Latin American
-69-
statements illustrated their expectation of a flow of 
public funds from the U.S. Meanwhile, U.S ••statements called 
for development planning, self-help measures and social 
reforms designed to increase local resources needed for 
development.*1 By 1961 U.S businessmen were undertaking few 
new ventures in the area. Perhaps Cuba’s expropriation of 
nearly $1 billion in U.S holdings was still too vivid. 
Table 5 shows that although reinvestment of profits by 
subsidiaries remained fairly stable, in the early years of 
the Alliance direct investment from the U.S dropped sharply 
from *173 million in 1961 to -*32 million in 1962. This 
drastic decline in investment and the growing evidence of 
domestic capital flight caught the Alliance’s attention. 
For if the estimates of an annual capital flight of *500 to 
*800 million are correct, then coupled with the adverse 
effects of the decline in foreign investment, they may have 
cancelled the beneficial effect of the Alliance’* flow of 
U.S public funds.** In his first annual review of the 
Alliance, Secretary Dillon commented thati
There is one area in which during the past year we have 
not only made no progress but where we have suffered a 
serious setback. Private investment, both domestic and 
foreign, has suffered damaging blows and lost 
confidence.•.The plain fact of the matter is that 
private enterprise has not always been made to feel 
that it is part of the Alliance.**
Table 5.
S um m ary  o f U . S  p r i v a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ,  
( m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
1V6J l ‘V6B
r e i  n v e s t e d d i r e c t  i n v e s t m ent  i n c o m e  r e c e i v e r !  i n  I J . S IH-t H i d
e a r n i n g s f r o m  t h e  U.S** ( p r o f i t s  and ear ru n g s ) 1.11 U.S
1961 2 5 5 173 - 7 3 0 - 5 5 7
1 962 2 6 8 - 3 2 — 76t 793
1963 173 6 9 - 8 0 1 7 52
1 964 2 1 6 143 - 8 9 5 -752
196 5 3 0 6 176 - 8 6 9 6 9 3
1 9 6 6 3 0 2 191 *965 7/4
1967 172 191 - 1 0 2 2 -U  1
1 9 6 8 ^ 2 1 0 481 108/ ,(»6
T O T A L 1 , 9 0 2 1,3V2 - / ,  1 >o 5. / 31
‘ a n e g a t i v e  number r e f l e c t ? ,  a net f l o w  to  the  U n i te d  S l a t e s  
*' e s t i in a ted .
('Source: U.S Department of Commerce, Survey at Current Fin-.-i m  . 
Levinson, Jerome anil rle Onis, Juan, The Al I t urn < th.U Lost it l-c
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Ad lustments were soon mr.de and after 1964. the Cuban 
threat seemed remote and now the Agency tor International 
Development specifically had the task of promoting U.S 
private investment. The resulting upsurge in investment can 
be seen in Table 5. This increase was such that by 1967, 
sales of U.S manufacturing subsidiaries in their Latin 
American markets 6 billion) exceeded U.S export sales to 
Latin America <*4.1 billion).** But certainly to a large 
extent this growth was due to the impulse of the CACM. 
Some specific examples of hGw AID aided overseas investment 
can be found in a pamphlet that they publish for 
businessmen, detailing the services that AID offers.
AID provides information on general investment 
opportunities contained in numerous industrial 
feasibility and economic studies of developing nations.
AID seeks to increase investment by United States 
private enterprise in the economies of friendly 
less-developed countries by sharing with U.S owned 
firms the cost of conducting surveys of investment 
opportunities.
AID seeks to increase investment by United States 
private enterprise in the economies of friendly 
less-developed countries by guaranteeing investors 
against certain political and business risks.
AID seeks to increase investment by pr ivate enter­
prise in the economies of friendly less-developed 
countr.es by helping to provide dollar financing for 
projects which promote economic development.
Certainly the figures which have been referred to would 
seem to suggest that much of the funds that flowed into 
Guatemala in specific would go towards improvinq the 
conditions for investment whether they were spent on 
infrestructure development projects or loans to industry. 
These last examples of how AID explicitly encouraged and 
protected private investment in Latin America are futher 
reinforcement. It is difficult to estimate the effect that 
such "aids*' had on investments one author states that the 
government has gone "about as far as it can go to promote 
U.S private foreign investment without outright 
subsidization."*■
THE ALLIANCE AND GUATEMALA
In Guatemala, the Alliance for Progress had continued 
its efforts to make it the “showpiece for democracy". As in 
the rest of Latin America, the Alliance for Progress 
encouraged private foreign investment in Guatemala in 
several ways. First much of the aid during these years 
concentrated on developing the infrestructure necessary for 
prosperous business conditions. The actions of those in the 
CACM that created various incentives to attract foreign
investors, and those? of AID the .agency that adminstered the 
Alliance tor Progress Funds, seemed to wort together 
towards the same goal. Between 1954 and 1970, Guatemala 
received more U.S dollars than any other Central American 
nation.(See Table 2) One could surmise that the greater the 
extent of U.S aid, the more a country would have to answer 
to the concerns of the U.S - such ru-, the protection of U.S 
investors. In spite of this it would appear that with 
respect to the other Central American nations Guatemala is 
relatively better off m  terms of this "control '* by U.S 
aid. Assistance is a lower percentage of GDP, of gross 
investment, of government tax revenue and of import 
earnings in Guatemala. However, per capita assistance is 
the lowest figure for the Central American nations. This 
would seem to indicate that the bulk of this aid only 
benefited certain sectors of the population. In the case 
of Guatemala then, how much did the Alliance do to achieve 
economic development, or did they simply, as in other 
countries, avert economic disaster?
THE END OF THE ALLIANCE
One should note that in the mid sixties under President 
Johnson and his adviser Thomas Mann, the focus of the 
Alliance gradually intensified the earlier focus on 
military assistance, the encouragement of private 
investment, and regional integration. Earlier aims of 
promoting democracy and structural change seemed
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increasingly subordinated during this period to military 
assistance due to the conerns over the rise in guerrilla 
activity sympathetic to Castro's actions in Cuba. The 
second focus on the broadening of private investment as an 
engine of development is expressed by Frank Bradenburg in
his study: The Development of Latin__Amerlean__Private
Enterpr 1 se.
Latin America has a long history of violent, authori­
tarian and extremist politics. The best hope for 
democrat i cat 1 on is in the growth of many diverse 
interest groups which are relatively independent of 
government. The danger of nationalizing industry is 
that it facilitates the nationalization of people* 
including ultimately the nationalization of their 
thoughts and beliefs. The advantage of private 
competitive enterprise is that it tends to encouraqe 
and sustain a free press* personal freedom, and free­
dom of thought and belief. It develops a strong 
interest in the maintenance of law and order. It offers 
channels for the unfolding of genuine creativeness and 
innovation arising from the varied background of native 
cultures. It is the best hope for development of 
political democracy, stability, and self-reliance in 
Latin America - that is, for achieving the basic 
objectives of the Alliance for Progress.**
Lastly, the third focus of the new administration would 
be on the support of regional integration. Acccording to
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Waiter LaFeber, as tne Alliance "died" and Vietnam grew 
more expensive, the common markets appealed to Johnson 
because they were “cheap" - in addition they were new 
frontiers for multinational industries and banks.** Herein 
lies what Delgado terms the “Achilles heel" of economic 
integration - "integration provides the vehicle for 
multinational corporations to enter regional marlets 
duty-free, diverting market-widening benefits from Latin 
American interests to United States, European and Japanese 
firms."*• Hence each of these three focuses of the Alliance 
for Progress would undoubtedly affect foreign investment. 
The increased military assistance would assuage the 
investors fears by combating the political instability in 
the form of guerrilla activities. The hopes placed in the 
role of private investment would greatly facilitate the 
foreign investors activities (i.e. he was offered 
incentives and certain concessions). Similarly, the fact 
that the success of the Common Market seemed to be the last 
chance for the Alliance for Progress meant that private 
investors received encouragement and benefits from both
processes.
Chapter 4. SHATTERED HOPES FOR PROGRESS
We must support all economic integration which 
is a genuine step toward larger markets and 
greater competitive opportunity. The 
iragmentation o-f Latin American economies is a 
serious barrier to industrial growth. Projects 
such as the Central American Common Market ... 
can help remove these obstacles.
John F. Kennedy. (1961)
GUATEMALA IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
An evaluation of the CACM must analyze the success of 
the two basic aims that had been present since the earliest 
discussions on regional integration. Une was to stimulate 
industrial development in these agricultural-export 
dependent countries of Central America. The other was to 
establish a free and open market that would foster a growth 
in interregional trade and whose free competition would 
inspire industrial development. Both goals would rely on 
attracting domestic and foreign capital. For the purposes 
of this study we are interested in the role foreign 
investment had in the CACM. According to certain authors, 
the constant avoidance of sacrifice - the material and 
political costs that each country had to make to implement 
integrative measures * explains why the influence of 
external forces on the origins and development of Central 
American integration are dicussed.* The most obvious 
material cost was the funds that were needed for such a 
wide-reaching project. Political costs might involve 
opening up the political process to a greater percentage of 
the population and giving up some national autonomy in 
order to achieve true cooperation between member nations. 
As was mentioned earlier, ECLA’s participation meant that 
the member nations did not worry about the costs of 
preliminary studies, as they were funded by the United
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Nations Technical Assistance Administration.3 bettlinq upon 
regional import substitution as a means towards 
industrlaliration assured the member governments that 
perhaps industrialization would be achieved without any 
major transformations in their societies.3 Hence from this 
beginning, further sacrifices were constantly avoided. In 
1960, the United States had offered to end the deadlock in 
the integrative process that has been described earlier, by 
providing funding for a common market. In return the member 
governments accepted the U.S government's conditions for 
participation.
If the achievements of this first aim are measured by 
figures showing an increase in interregional trade, then 
this integration experiment wa^ a success. Other authors 
may have a different interpretation.
But the expansion of the national markets - the main 
justification for economic integration among less
developed countries - was not only related to the num-
$
ber of consumers that cou.d be brought together but 
also to the more controversial question of the income 
level of the majority of the participant's population. 
The creation of a regional market of 15 million people 
in Central America was an illusion as long as the 
capacity to consume of the peasant sector was not 
drastically improved. To this extent any policy
concerned almost exclusively with industrialization was
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severely limited and risked becoming a costly e:ercise
in exaggerated protectionism.4
By 1964 it seemed increasingly clear that the aims of 
industrial development through regional import
substitution, and the creation of a free, open market were 
incompatible. and the impending crisis of the CACh 
culminated in the soccer war between El Salvador and 
Honduras in 1969. After the demise of the Alliance for 
Progress and the CACM did foreign investment meet a similar 
fate? Since the growth in foreign investment during the 
sixties was not a secondary effect of the CACM but rather 
the very impulse behind the CACM, it no longer seems likely 
that private direct foreign investment dwindled in 1969 
with the CACM. Rather after successful beginnings amidst 
the favorable climate of the time, it appears that foreign 
investment in the form of multinational corporations
continued to grow into the seventies.
The attempt to initiate industrialisation through 
import substitution may be considered a success if one 
measures it in terms of the sharp growth in interregional 
trade. To further enhance this growth, the prices of 
traditional export products recovered from the lower levels 
of the late 1950's. Financing by the Central American Bank 
and other international institutions aided in the creation 
of necessary infrastructure for beneficial trade and 
economic developments highway construction, facilities for 
the generation and dlstributior of electricity and port
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improvements. It must b<# observed that such improvements in 
infrastructure would of course be attractive to potential 
investors. See Table 1 and the subsequent graph which 
demonstrate the boom in interregional trade. In looking at 
the total exports of Guatemala to the other nations in the 
Common Market, one can appreciate the magnitude of this 
boom. From 1960, its first year of existence, to 1965, 
export trade increased by almost 24o percent. Expansion 
continued from 1965 to 1970 when trade grew by 253 percent 
or on the average about 50 percent per year. This 
astounding growth slowed down after 1970 when it grew only 
26 percent between 1970 and 1975. Actually this drop to an 
average of 5.2 percent growth per year is quite dramatic 
and could be due to the effects the 1969 war had on 
interregional trade. Nevertheless, these figures indicate 
that up until 1978 there continued to be growth in 
Guatemala's exports to the the rest of the Common Market.
It is important to have an idea of the kinds of goods 
that Guatemala exported to the CACM in order to measure 
whether the import substitution model of industrialization 
prevailed. Table 2 shows the character and value of 
Guatemala's exports to the CACM in 1967. As it occurred 
before the war in 1969 it may give one a picture of trade 
during the most prosperous years of the Common Market. 
Significantly, the value of exports composed of chemical 
products, manufactured articles, and machinery (what one 
could call Mindustrial products11) accounted for almost 67
Guatemala
f a b l e  4 , 1
: Intraregional Trade ( i n
(based on exports)
D e s t  i n a t  i on I9 6 0 196: 1970 1975
C o s t a  R i c a . 1 7 2 . 7 8 2 0 .  1 2 8 .5 7
E l  S a l v a d o r 7 .51 10 . 5 8 3 0 . 8 5 7 . 0 7
H o n d u r a s - 68 8 .  73 2 8 .  9 1 7 . 30
N i c a r a g u a . 17 6 . 8 8 1 4 . 5 2 5 .8 3
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percent of Guatemala’s total export** to the CACI1. 8/ some 
standards, the data in fable 2 might indicate that indeed 
industrialisation Mas a resounding success. For it is 
likely that the exported food products Mere of a processed 
variety and even beveraqes and tobacco indicate that such 
industries had been created. Vet it should be recalled that 
2/3 of the economically active population of Central 
America Mas engaged in agriculture. What Mas the
consumption capacity of the peasants, the largest sector of 
the population? The entire scope of the regional market 
represented 15 million people groMing at a rate of 3.5 
percent annually with a regional average per capita income 
of $305 annually. But the subsistence sector of agriculture 
in Central America had an average regional per capita 
income of $70-100 annually.® It seems unlikely therefore, 
that the type of goods shown m  Table 2 were accesible to 
the majority of Central Americans. Furthermore, while 
Guatemala and the other member nations mads a concerted 
effort to create a manufacturi ng industry, Table 3 
indicates that the composition of total exports was still 
dominated by the traditional products, coffoe, sugar and 
cotton (they accounted for S6 percent of exports in 1967). 
Interestingly, Table 4 indicates that the composition of 
total imports, in large part, was devoted to nee raw 
materials and '’ingredients" required by the emphasis on 
industri alizatien, Usual1y tha prices for Guatemalan 
agricultural products mere much lower than mhat they had to
\ S Jfe
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pi-nd tor i f ems such us riachi ntr ^ , chemic.<i product6 
etc... Hence this dit-ference in the value of exports and 
imports created a burden on the country's balance oi 
payments, which was positive only durinq the last tew years 
of Arbenz’s term. By other standards, this would hardly be 
called industrlalization. But, m  conclusion, if industrial 
development is measured solely in terms at growth in 
interregianal trade, then the data considered indicates 
considerable achievements.
Amidst the heady growth ot this period those that urged 
caution and attention to the requirements tor a "balanced 
development" were paid scant attention. It appears that 
there were tew controls established on the course ot 
investment and economic development and wnen attempts were 
made, such as the Joint Economic Programming Mission, there 
were no mechanisms to tollow through with the 
recommendations. This Mission established in 1962 was to 
identity economic sectors which could be objects ot both 
regional and long-term global development. Despite much 
research and creation ot strategies it was realized that 
not only was there little support trom the member countries 
tor such a scheme, but also no mechanism existed to carry 
it out.*In short, member countries loathed making any 
material or political sacritices for the integrative 
process. Rather than learning to upgrade the common 
interest, the participants learned to put into practice 
those measures whose economic consequences were buttered by
- 8 5 -
7abl_0_ 4 ._,’
Guatemala: Value of the principal er.por^
thousands of dollars; U|"odut:ts - 196/
Product Val ue
Coffee 69593. Percentage
Cotton 31493.^ 35. 2
Sugar 9769.8 15.9
heat 7967.1 4.9
Vegetable products 5612.8 4.0
Fresh fruit and nuts 4924.4 2.8
(non-oleaginous) 







Cosmetic products 3594.7 o m• 4-
Textiles(cotton) 3485.8 1.8
Materials destined 3441.1 1.8
for animal feed 
Manufactured items(cork) 













Fish and crustaceans 2171.4










Chemical products 1464.7 a /<» 7
Assorted manufactured article 1452.6 0.7 
0. 7Manufactured articles (glass 1427.8
Zinc 1359.7 O. 7
Canned fruits 1297.4 0. 7
Vegetable oils 1255.9 O. 6
Margarine and lard 1198.9 0. 6
Paper pulp and paper products 1192.7 0. 6
Tobacco products 1128.9 0.6
Articles made from textiles 1111.3 0. 6
(not clothing or shoes) 
Packaged, prepared meats 1081.6 0. 5
Mood 1070.5 0. 5
Seeds, nuts and almonds 1017.5 0. 5
(oleaginous) 
Mi seel 1aneous 14978.2 7.6
TOTAL 197939 100. 0




Value of principal imports 
(thousands of dollars)
- 1967
Products Val ue Per a
Machines for mining, construct ion 19487.1 7.9
and other industrial uses
Automotive vehicles 17334.
Textile threads 13403.7 5.4
Machines and electrical 12796.3 5.2
i terns
Chemical products 12005.1 4.9
Iron and steel 11755.7 4.8
Manufactured articles (metal) 10394.7 4.2
Pharmaceutical products 9430.7 3.8
and medscenes
Organic chemical products 6651.1 2.7
Paper and cardboard 6068.5 n *5Jte. 9 W
Live animals 5967.6 2.4
Assorted manufactured articles 584 7,9 2.4
Articles of clothing 5362.2 n tA • w>
Ferti1izerr 3561.3 2.2
Wheat 4786.4 1.9
Textiles (cotton) 4731.9 1.9
Crude petroleum, partially 4691.9 1.9
refined
Paper pulp and cardboard products 4425.1 1.8
Petroleum derivitives 4026.5 1.6
Inorganic chemical products 3425.5 1.4
Textiles 3337.7 1.3
Tractors 2550.0 1. 1
Special textiles 2504.0 1.0
Animal oil and lard 2442.5 1.0
Materials destined for animal fee 2328.2 0.9
Power generating machinery 2325.1 0.9
Glass manufacturing 2096.5 0.8
Mi seel1aneous 58465.9 23.7
TOTAL 247098.0 100.0
CSources Guatemala, Anuario de Comercio Exterior, 
1967-19693
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■foreign assistance?. Avoiding the gradual transfer of 
expectations to a larger entity, each member pursued the 
satisfaction of his individual interests by such 
uncooperative methods as retaliatory measures against its 
partners or the dedicated protection of its national 
producers against regional competition.7 Instead of 
coordinating their individual programs of industrial 
development, in the spirit of free competition the Central 
American countries strove to attract plants. Given the 
small size of the market- which might only be able to 
support a very few firms in one given industry - this could 
result in such dangers as a proliferation of similar 
projects, and an excess of installed capacity. • Actually, 
the only type of "industrial planning program" that was 
established was proposed in 1963 and involved a permanent 
system of customs incentives for the promotion of new 
industries. Called the "Special System for the Promotion of 
industrial Activities" it greatly differed from the 
Regional Integrated Industry plan proposed by ECLA. It 
consisted of establishing protective tariffs for those 
articles whose production was considered to be essential to 
the economic development of Central America. Tariffs were 
set protecting such products as plate glass, glass 
containers, electric light bulbs, bodies and chassis for 
buses and trucks, and refrigeration units. The so called 
transformation industry had to meet the requirement of 
filling 50 percent of the regional demand.* The critical
- 8 0 -
difterenc© between this pi an and that of M I  wa'3 thdt the 
new system made no provision for dealinq with the problem 
of where to equitably locate the plants <the idea of 
balanced development), and it did not require a minimum 
level of Central American ownership of capital. Hence, both 
domestic and foreign private investment which had feared 
the kind of government intervention implied in the earlier 
scheme of ECLA, found a broad entry in the new system. 
Table 5 chronicles private investment m  Central America 
during the early years of the CACM. El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica all show a marked rise in private 
investment after I960. Guatemala, in terms of GDP, the 
largest economy in Central America, shows private 
investment fluctuating around 1.5 percent of the GDP in 
these years. Industries which had remained stalled in the 
process of negotiation were established. Many industries 
were established in those countries which had a larger 
domestic market and therefore a broader base for industrial 
development. Less developed countries like Honduras and 
Nicaragua were gradually being left behind. In summary, the 
free competition implicit in this free market strategy 
together with high tariffs of the CACM did encourage 
investment in industrialization. But it appears that most 
of the competition occurred between member countries to 
attract foreign companies with their capital and know-how, 
to their countries. In this endeavor countries like 
Guatemala that had a relatively broads~ industrial base and
Private Investment in Central America 1957-1963. 
(in millions of Central American pesos)
T m b l m  4.5
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Guatemala 17. 1 17.2 23.5 19.4 13.2 16.4 19.0
El Salvador -1.3 5.7 -6.0 9.6 13.0 12.0 19.7
Honduras 1.5 -6.4 -4.0 -7.9 -6.4 2.9 9.7
Nicaragua 13.8 5.3 3.4 5.6 1.8 16.7 14.2
Costa Rica 3. 1 -0.4 7.5 4.7 4.5 20.9 25.5
Gross Domestic Product 
(in millions of
in Central America 1957-1963. 
Central American pesos)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Guatemala 940 971 991 1021 1043 1092 1 174
El Salvador - 499 478 491 512 664 718
Honduras 344 362 375 378 398 426 440
Nicaragua 342 343 349 353 376 416 446
Costa Rica 354 382 395 417 429 476 503
[Source: Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion 
Economica Centroamericana (SIECA), Cuarto Compendio E s t a d i f a t i c o  
Centreamericano<12 de octubre, 1965),p.811
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more e:;tenci ve mf rastructurr? appare•n t iv  met with stif cess.
The lack of controls on both foreign and domestic
industrial investment might have led to the boom in
i nterregional trade, but i t  also created serious imbalances 
that Mould  undermine the CACM in 196V when such  imbalances 
played an important role in t h e  gestation o f  th e  war 
between El Salvador and Honduras.
GROWTH OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
From the beginning of the CACM, the U.b government 
contributed the bulk of funding for its planning, research, 
and financial agencies. In 1965 and 1966 U.S funds 
represented 54 percent of the budget for the nine CACM 
agencies, 33 percent came from countries outside the 
region, and only 13 percent of the annual budget came from 
the member nations.40 These nations agreed in turn to 
accept the "proper" rules of th«* game by refraining from 
interfering with free market forces or foreign 
investment,41 The reduction of trade barriers, the 
incentives offered to investors and the lack of joint 
industrial policies in the CACM resulted in the unchecked 
growth of foreign investment. (See Table 6,> It appears 
that a majority of the direct foreign investment in Central 
America both before (1959) and during the period of the 
CACM (1969) was in Guatemala. This table indicates that 
between 1959 and 1969, direct foreign investment grew by 
almost 95 percent in Central America. There are different
/
D i r e c t  F o r e i g n  Inve s tm en t  in  C e n t r a l  «,nt,*r k :„ 




C o s t a  R i c a */ ’ r ' * i a .  9 i / 3. 7 2 .9
E 1 S a 1vador 4 >. V u . i 114 .6 15.1
Buaternala l . > /. 6 35.  4 2*u /. O 7 7.4
Hondura s l i b .  5 79 „ 3 1 B4 . 1 14. 4
Ni c a r  agiia IB.  V 4 . 9 76. ' to.  t
Cer» t r a J Airier i l j :.b b . . lUD. l l 755. 1« “ ». <»
tr t e ;  Uer i  K o se n U u i l  , "A lyur ios  as pet t o s  *.(it i« e t* 1
■ l L ' i p a c i o n  de 1 wl i n ver s i  on e,; 1 r 11 f or a d j
‘ ‘s o  «It * lot t n t e g r ai 11 it» i:»*i 1 1 r  oamer i c arm " . n .7/ . .  i
t *r . i«J« i 11«* 
n  i
i n t  o r p r e t a t  i ons ot this g r o w i n g  invol /pment of d i r e c t
foreign investment during these years ot the C#-»CM.
in the opinion of Myra Wilkins the main reason for the 
growth of the U.S direct investment was the import 
substitution policies of the late 1950’s and the early 
1960’s. Host government action, as in Central America, to 
encourage industrial1 cation had forced U.S businesses to 
transform their sales, service, and assembly operations 
into manufactur 1 ng facilities. Because of barriers to U.S 
exports this was tfn» only way American companies could 
maintain their markets. Hence, the geographical scope, and 
the degree of integration and diversif 1 cat ion of U.S 
investment* in manufacturmg steadily grew. 454 Previously, 
major U.S investment interests had been in the exploration 
and extraction of petroleum, but by 1966 in Latin America, 
the majority of U.S direct investment concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector. Guatemala was no exception.(See Table
7) It should be noted that much of the production ot these 
manufacturing facilities was destined for the regional 
market as asserted by Wilkins. By 196B, U.S manufacturing 
companies in Latin America sold about 89 percent of their 
output in the host country.4®
However, Wilkins asserts that U.S direct investments in 
manufacturing were stil) greater in Europe and she 
expresses surprise that after Latin American governments 
had pressured investors in uuch a manner there should now 
exist alarm over what was seen as foreign domination.44
-97-
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While in terms of absolute .Amount'; fhis mav be* true, in 
relative terms the U.S presence in Latin America was of far 
greater importance to those countries. U.S direct 
investments not only represented a large** percentage of the 
country** economy, but historically they were able to wield 
much greater economic and political leverage than m  
Europe. The second interpretation of the growing 
involvement of direct foreign investment during the years 
of the CACM decried what they saw as domination of national 
industry by the foreign economic powers.
It is often pointed out that the problem of the Cf :m
was that each of the five countries was small ai id
essential 1y a producer of the same raw materials and
commodities - so what benefits could be accrued by
increased interregional trade? Rather, goods like
machinery, industrial items and processed 'oods were traded 
in the CACIf, and these goods benefited from the reduced 
tariffs. Critics of the integration process maintain that 
United States corporations were the main producers of these 
items in the five Central American countries.1" Hence in 
the opinion of many, U.S aid helped create and destroy the 
CACM. For them the increased U.S aid of the period was only 
a means of manipulating people and governments in Central 
America to suit the particular needs and whims of corporate 
investors and to keep the region safe for them.1" Their 
presence9 a result of minimal government control and tax 
incentives, had numerous ramifications. The tax exemptions
“ 9 5 -
allowing the highest rate? of prof 1 t to be a r h i  p> e-d r ■> 
importing the bull of material input’s ^nd (he
repatriation of profits put pressure on the b.il <nee of 
payments too. Many national producers could simpiv not 
compete with the capital. I now-how. and technology at the 
U.S companies. The resulting foreion domination of the most 
dynam 1 c: 1 ndust rial ser t>r s d i d not par 1 1 *u l ar ) y aid
national economic development. In addition, countries llie 
Guatemala could not be? consoled bv  the idea that such 
foreign investment was creating many jobs for the growing 
population because often the type of technology used 
resulted in only a slow increase in employment.1' The ne::t 
chapter will examine the character and distribution of 
foreign investment in Guatemala more closely, but at this 
point. one may summarize the different i nt er pr et at i ons of 
tho foreign investment that the policies of the CACM 
encouraged. Some, life author Wilkins, might assert that 
the 9b percent increase in direct foreign investment in 
Central America between 1959 and 1969 resulted merely from 
investors playing by tne "rules" of the Common Market. 
Critics of the deepening presence of direct foreign (mostly 
American) investment in Central America seem to suggest 
that it resulted from the U.S attending to its own needs 
for expanded markets. The Deputy Chief of the United States 
Embassy in Guatemala when asked if he felt that the CACM 
was a greater benefit to the United States than to Central 
American countries, answered; “The Central American Common
Market, i s  m  the but
96-
- riPl f i interest at the United bt at oci, 
fortunately our selfish interests coincide with those of 
the Central American countries."1* It is a simplification 
to assume that the CACM served the interests of Central 
American nations as a whole. Rather only the concerns of a 
small segment of the population were addressed bv the CACM. 
The elite, with their traditional dominance in agriculture, 
banking and commerce, received the benefits of cooperation 
with the United States interests in the Central American 
integration process. Whatever the differences in opinion, 
it is agreed that the lack of controls of the free market 
allowed this growth m  domestic and especially foreign 
investment. These same conditions that encouraged 
investment would lead to the serious imbalances that 
eventually debilitated the CACM in 1969.
CRISIS IN THE CACM
After the initial so called "success" of the CACM, 
measured hy the tremendous growth in trade, the major 
principle of the market, that of free trade, began to 
result in imbalances that togsther would culminate in war 
in 1969. The war that erupted between two members of the 
CACM, El Salvador and Honduras, disrupted the CACM. 
Although technically the CACM did not terminate at this 
time and efforts to revitalise it still continue to this 
day, since this is not a study of the CACM, 1969 will be
- 9 7 “
treated as the effective collapse nt this development 
effort.
The process of industrialization in Central America 
evolved in the environment of an open market where
protective fiscal measures produced a major flow of 
regional trade in manufacturing products with a high 
content of imported raw materials. Some secondary results 
of this t^ade were decreased fiscal receipts and higher 
prices for the Central American consumers. A serious crisis 
in government revenues arose since historically, since the 
19th century, the bulk of tax income had originated from 
imports.** These effects were not dis ributed evenly. Free 
trade meant that the investment was drawn to the countries 
of Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador which had a much 
broader industrial base.(See Table 6). Inese countries 
benefited from this fiscal situation as they were able to 
pass the cost of the imported components almost totally to 
the consumers in the other two importing countries. The 
Protocol of San Jose further added tariffs of 30 percent to 
raw materials imported from outside of the CAGM and the 
consequent price rise of final manufacturing products 
further intensified the protests of Honduras and Nicaragua 
who were becoming burdened with an ever more critical 
balance of payments problem and the feeling that the 
benefits of regional integration escaped them.ao
There seemed to be a wealth of instruments available to 
this integration program for formulating and implementing a
-98-
strategy of balanced economic development.-1 These 
includedi the annual meetinq of Ministers ot Economic 
Affairs* the Permanent Secretariat ot the General Treaty ot 
Central American Economic Integration (SIECA): two 
institutions- ICAXTI, created to deal with industrial 
technology, and ICAR, in charge ot the training ot national 
bureaucrats!; and the Central American Bank ot Economic 
Integration (CABEI). But these agencies were unable to 
overcome the growing stagnation ot integration. The 
inability ot the five member nations to agree on the 
problems and solutions ot integration did little to improve 
the matter. Furthermore, these regional agencies were being 
asked to consider problems formerly under the jurisdiction 
of national governments.** These conflicts -.»*?• ■ »d to 
culminate in the July 14, 1969 Soccer War t Ur en El 
Salvador and Honduras, a war that cannot be attributed 
simply to the outcome of a soccer match, but rather to the 
steadily worsening imbalances triggered by the integration 
process. Thus the overall failure of :he "painless 
development" process set forth by the CACM may be due to 
what author Cohen Orantes terms, the "low" cost process 
adopted by the member nations. The notion of low and high 
cost processes refers to the efforts and the concessions, 
in material and political aspects, that had to be assumed 
in order to implement the integrative process.** 
Industrialization by means of regional import substitution 
ensured that industrialization would not exact a high price
-99-
m  terms of major transformat.ions in Central American 
societies. The fact that member nations stayed within the 
confines set up by import substitution probably led to 
negative consequences for participant's economic growth to 
the extent that it promoted inefficient activities in terms 
of too many producers for the market to support, and in 
terms of the character of goods produced.34 We have seen 
how the member nations zealously competed to attract 
industry and the nature of the goods traded. The small size 
of the Central American market could not support the 
ensuing proliferation of similar industries and furthermore 
the sort of goods they produced were not needed and could 
not be afforded by the vast majority of the Central 
American population. Again in I960, the committment to the 
“Io n " cost route to industrialization was affirmed when the 
CACM countries accepted the United States conditions for 
financial support. As the pressure of foreign investment 
grew and dominated some sectors of the national economies 
the member nations realized the limitations that the 
financing of industrialization by foreign investment 
involved. So, the failure of the Common Market that was 
underscored by the 1969 Soccer War, really resulted from 
the repeated refusal to make the sacrifices, and pay the 
"high" costs for economic development. Economic development 
seems to have been equated solely with industrialization. 
True economic development would involve making radicial 
changes in the structure of production and in the
distribution of income. In Guatemala the economy Mas
dependent on the export of a few crops, this situation 
would not change in spite of the Common Market. 
Furthermore, in 1968 two percent of the landowners owned 72 
percent of the land and 90 percent owned and operated 15 
percent of the land. Farms with 1,115 acres or more of 
land, 0.3% of all farms, controlled more than half of all 
the arable land in the nation.31* Committment to changes in 
these situations would exact a high price from this two 
percent engaged in traditional export agriculture. Indeed, 
economic development would be costly in social, economic 
and political terms. Socially, many would feel threatened 
by enlarging the benefits of the vast Indian, peasant 
population. Effecting these changes would diminish the 
profits that had been garnered from the export of coffee, 
sugar, cotton and bananas. Lastly, as in the rest of Latin 
America, political power was equated with the ownership of 
land, redistribution of land or de-emphasis on traditional 
export agriculture would challenge the elites dominance in 
this sphere. So those responsible for integration in 
Central America ignored the most urgent problem of those 
countries, where 2/3 of the economically active population 
was engaged in agriculture, that of agricultural 
improvement. The growth of the Central American economies 
that had been measured by the growth of interregional trade 
might have slowed down after 1969, but this does not seem 
to have been the case with the direct foreign investment
100-
distribution of income. In Guatemala the economy was 
dependent on the export of a few crops, this situation 
would not change in spite of the Common Market, 
Furthermore, in 1968 two percent of the landowners owned 72 
percent of the land and 90 percent owned and operated IS 
percent of the land. Farms with 1,115 acres or more of 
land, 0.3V. of all farms, controlled more than half of all 
the arable land in the nation.”  Committment to changes in 
these situations would exact a high price from this two 
percent engaged in traditional export agriculture. Indeed, 
economic development would be costly in social, economic 
and political terms. Socially, many would feel threatened 
by enlarging the benefits of the vast Indian, peasant 
population. Effecting these changes would diminish the 
profits that had been garnered from the export of coffee, 
sugar, cotton and bananas. Lastly, as in the rest of Latin 
America, political power was equated with the ownership of 
land, redistribution of land or de-emphasis on traditional 
export agriculture would challenge the elites dominance in 
this sphere. So those responsible for integration in 
Central America ignored the most urgent problem of those 
countries, where 2/3 of the economically active population 
was engaged in agriculture, that of agricultural 
improvement. The growth of the Central American economies 
that had been measured by the growth of interregional trade 
might have slowed down after 1969, but this does not seem 
to have been the case with the direct foreign investment
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that impulsed the CACM. After the initial surge due to the 
■favorable climate created bv the CACM, foreign investment, 
represented by multinational corporations continued to 
prosper in Central America and Guatemala into the 
seventies.
We ere trying to ensure your investments 
and we would like all the organirations 
and the businessmen that are able to 
invest in Guatemala... UJe guarantee your 
investments. The government has said so.
president has said so. The judges 
have said so. Those in charge of the 
security of the country have said so. I 
want all North Americans to come and 
invest in Guatemala."
General Benedicto Lucas Garcia, 
former army chief of staff.
Chapter 5. A GOOD PLACE TO DO BUSINESS
MULTI NATIONAL OPbftkliUlV: IN GUh TEHALA H'< AMERICAN t'.OMPANlLS
The growth in U.S multinational investments in the late 
1950’* was a worldwide phenomenon. Bv 1^57, 2,300 U.S 
businesses had stakes in some lu.OOO direct investment 
enterprises abroad - the sales of U.^ controlled business 
abroad were known to exceed U.S exports.1 Generally those 
companies that thus expanded their market had a 
technological advantage, leadership in American industry 
and/or established overseas stakes. Primarily their sales 
consisted of: transportation equipment, chemicals, 
machinery, food products, electrical machinery, and primary 
and fabricated metals. It has been noted that at this time 
the U.S government had a policy of actively encouraging 
investment in the less developed countries of the world. 
Wilkins again contends that "...foreign conditions and the 
actions of foreign governments far more than the policies 
of the U.S government influenced the decisions of American 
investors abroad..."* Rather, American investors were 
disposed to concentrate in areas with a high standard of 
living, healthy economic growth, resources and a favorable 
political environment for investors. She supports this with 
the fact that U.S direct investment in developed nations 
(•53.1 billion) was almost 2.5 times as great as that in 
less developed countries ($21.4 billion).3 This does not 
diminish the importance of the U.S investment in Latin 
America though, and one has seen how Guatemala with its
~ ! i
abundant natural resources at’empled t:o .^ recite «n 
appropriate climate tor just such investors. This topic ot 
U. S foreign investment always incites strong feelings an 
the part of those who defend its advantages arid those who 
bitterly criticize its record. We will rely "gain on 
Wilkins' defense of U.> direct foreign investment t»nd her 
perception of the crit. lcisms that have been leveled against 
it. Those that articulate the objections she mentions, 
often dedicate themselves to exposing the excess ot u.s 
companies in the respective Latin American nations. Hence, 
the information obtained on the different kinds ot U.S 
direct private investment in Guatemala often express the 
views of these critics. Basically then, these two 
conflicting opinions over the growth ot American 
multinationals in Guatemala since 1954, will be discussed.
GUATEMALA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
fhe Guatemalan government during the CACM in the late 
sixties was eager to attract the many multinational
corporations who were expanding their operations overseas. 
Their eagerness to attract and cooperate with investors is 
reflected in the following excerpt from part of a campaign 
of the National Export Promotion Centre of Guatemala.
Just two and a half hours from New Orleans, in the 
heart of Central America, a new American frontier has 
been opened. Both aggressive multinational corporations 
and lone entrepeneurs have discerned the path of
- 1 • 4 -
r •' ' n f a t : • * i.1 r ur and d i r - , - . r  i ..( ! ' 11 ,y
ijlint e maJa . I n M u -1 y e r n a c u i a r ( < t' t nf-
*  r  on 1 1 e r s m a n , the country is ' bus t  k n > wide- op^n " . fhure- 
are excellent reasons why (.maternal the most highly
favored site for new investment right now - political 
and economic stability, resources, modern iiuppor t. 
facilities.*
Indeed, some have maintained that the community of U.d 
and Guatemalan businessmen is probat iy the most tightly 
integrated, socially, economic a 1ly , and politically in all 
of Latin America. The multinatlonal corporations honor the 
domain of local monopolies held traditionally by old 
Guatemalan families, and defend the Guatemalan regime in 
the U.S while in turn the government imposes no 
restrictions on the financial operations of these 
companies.3 Hence there were a variety of favorable
conditions and exemptions thac these companies enjoyed. 
Tht,'e were no transfer restrictions on any hind of 
toreign-owned assets, dividends, and interest and there was 
no fixed amount of profit that had to be reinvested in 
industry. Furthermore, any laws giving pref erent. 1 al 
treatment to domestic capital were repealed in 1959. 
Foreign companies were exempt from payment of duties on 
imports of construction materials, factory machinery and 
equipment, raw materials and automotive vehicles for 
industrial use. They were also exempt from payment of taxes 
for 5  years and could obtain a 50 percent reduction on
ta-es for th»* foil, owinq j vt ?*rr. t*l) fh such measur t?*:,, not 
only could foreign capital be assured that t h e y  would not 
have to worry about local competition, but it is difficult 
to imagine how they could help not controlling the market.
Still it might be difficult to comprehend that the 
incentives the Guatemalan and U.b government offered 
foreign investors were enough to induce them to establish 
in a less developed nation. There was always the question 
of economic and political stability and the rudimentary 
infrastructure. In light of the unrest in all of Central 
America during the 1970's and continuing to this day, this 
question is ask^d with more urgency. Vet in 1981 and AVX 
Ceramics executive in El Salvador commented!
Me cannot meet the competition of the Japanese in in 
Europe with supplies from the United States. The U.S 
cost of production is higher than the sellinq price m  
Europe. But we can compete from Central America...and 
our experience shows that you can operate in a 
disturbed climate.*
Maybe his experience showed him what a Department of 
Commerce report would conclude? that it is no small saving 
for a U.S company to locate in Central America. The report 
found that the average wage rate in U.S Central American 
subsidiaries of $1.08 per hour was eight times lower than 
the average wage rate of $8.76 per hour m  the parent 
companies in the U.S.7 Or possibly his experience bore out 
the Department of Commerce in 1979 when it reported that
-  1 06
the r.t*;e rO return on U.6 direct investment in Latin 
America was 19.6 percent while the average international 
rate of return for U.S direct investment was /.*> percent..* 
This means that a U.S company in Latin America could make 
258 percent more than it could in another country. This is 
doubtless a powerful stimulus for foreign investment and it 
is little wonder that so many corporations would decide to 
do business in places like Guatemala.
U.S investors in Central America range from the largest 
transnational corporations to smaller retail operations. It 
is interesting to note that in a study conducted at Harvard 
of 187 multinational corporations, of the 120 manufacturing 
subsidiaries they had in Central America, SO percent had 
been established after 1957.* With repect to Guatemala, 
this means that the subsidiaries took advantage of the 
business climate nurtured after the coup. In Guatemala U.S 
investments have increased through acquisitions of local 
firms, joint ventures with local firms or production 
arrangements with other firms.40
Because the transnationals had access to credit and 
higher technology and enough reserves to withstand 
temporary losses they could operate more efficiently and 
make a profit. Local capital formation declined as U.S 
companies acquired local companies.44 Some of these local 
firms had existed aa monopolies because the limited size of 
the market could only support one firm.1* See Table 1 for 
examples of Guatemalan firms that U.S companies acquired.
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1959 1965 8/ 150,000
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1969 9u 100,000
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Whiie other .authors: li»e Hvra Wilkins speak at fho 
advantages of joint ventures there are those who feel they 
only benefit the U.S company and the well-to-do buatemalan 
who forms a partnership with it. Historically, key sectors 
of Guatemala's economy were dominated by families who had 
usually made their fortune in export agriculture. He the 
bulk of foreign exchange had been acquired through these
sort of export activities, these families were the same
1 ocal capitalists who were able to engage i n joint
ventures . Hence their prominent posi tion was only
reinforced. The most obvious result of joint ventures in 
their opinion is that local wealth is absorbed as the local 
economy comes under U.S corporate control. Another benefit 
for the investor is that the risks of nationalization are 
diminished. Furthermore, the interests of the Guatemalan 
elite are linked with those of the U.S corporation and the 
surplus they appropriate only further intensifies the 
distortions in income distributions.13
Production contracts with local *irm? allowed U.S 
companies to enter the Guatemalan with initially 
little capital outlay or risk. Some of the surjiu- derived 
then remained with the local producer. Usually the U.S 
company would eventually acquire the local firm.14 Table 2 
seeme to indicate that especially in the manufacturing 
sector, a substantial numbe< <49 percent) of U.S firms 
participated in joint ventures. Many of the industries 
that were located in Guatemala and Central America in this
T ab 1 p Pi. 2
U . S F i r  ms
Sector
i n J o i n t  V e n t u r e s  i n
T o t a l  number  o f  
i n  the* s e c t o r
G u a t e m a l a : 19/1 
U . S  f i r m s  P e r c e n t
Hi iul l i t
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  5 7
S e r v i c e s  j fl
Commerce 26
C o n s t r u c t i o n  i=r
M i n i n g  and  F i n a n c e  A g r i c u l t u r e
0
TOTAL 1 in
[ S o u r c e :  P h i l  C h u r c h ,  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t :  The O p e r a t i o n
I n v e s t m e n t  in  G u a t e m a l a ,  " urn l a s s i  f l e d  H .S  AII> ducon.i.,.t 
f r  om NACLA VI I nu . f *  1977 . . ]
manner were? on I / finishing operations for «r,emi -met u.if nc t ur e-d 
goods. They are sometimes termed - "t1 mshino-touch“, 
screwdriver or wrap and pact industries. Essentially, 
although the product might say uHecho en tentroamerica", 
the only elements genuinely Central American were those 
used in packaging.10 Later in the 1970’fs, the electronics 
and textile industry would set up labor intensive assembly 
operations called maaui1adoras. Maquilador $, s wou id as s emb1e 
basic materials produced in the U.S at a much lower labor 
cost and then the assembled electronics part and clothing 
would be shipped to the U.S tor further manufacture or 
distribution. Such operations are criticized because due to 
the small magnitude of investment in plant facilities or 
equipment, they can move on easily to a cheaper area of the 
world to do business.1*
The presence of foreign investment has certainly 
diversified since the days when UFLO, IRCA and Empresa 
Electrics dominated Guatemala. In the late 1960’s IRCA and 
Empresa Electrics sold their holdings to the Guatemalan 
government•&T (JFCO also disposed of some of its holdings in 
the late 1950’s, but still in 1958 an antitrust ruling 
found United Fruit guilty of monopolizing the banana trade. 
As the deadline for divestiture approached UFCQ was 
purchased by United Brands in 1970. Del Monte approached 
United Brands with a purchase offer for the company's 
Guatemalan plantations. For $20.5 million in 1972, Del 
Monve acquired 55,000 acres of prime agricultural land.
,->t r ' *t - h i n ' j from p l a n t a t i o nplus an aqroi ndustr i a.l complex 
to port.*•
Although the siqruficance o+ these three firms and 
their investments in agriculture, transportation and public 
utilities has ended, U.S holdings have increased remart ably 
in manufacturing. Table 3 illustrates that while m  
comparison with rest of the Central American members of the 
CACM the manufacturing industry's share of the GUP is less 
in Guatemala, nevertheless this share has increased in each 
of the ind. "lated years. In addition. Table 4 gives one an 
even better grasp of the extent of the involvement of 
foreign investment in the manufactur1 ng sector. In five 
different areas of this sector foreign companies account 
for a majority of the production.
Of the 19 firms in the tobacco industry represented in 
Table 4, the two foreign companies, PhilllD Morris and 
British-American Tobacco represent 99 Percent of the 
production. Although 231 national companies represent the 
majority of the production in the food processing i .dustry, 
the comparatively small numbers of for*lo .
account for 18.6 percent that i s c*n ’verage o >  1.4
percent per foreign company and 0.32 percent 
company.) In Guatemala this indust otters -^uch things as
nat:anal
chewi ng guntp margarine, food enacts, instan coffee and
f
i't
J ab 1 o 5. 3
S h a r e  rif mariit f ar t u r  i ng  l n d u s t r  y i n Gl)l* (a t l /7<)  pi i < i
G u a t e m a l a F I  S a l v a d o r
( p e r c e n t a g e s )
H o n d u r a s Ni caratj i tr i  ( \ )•. 1 . : « t
1945 n - a 1 1 . 4 7 . 5 1 1 . 4 1 1 - .
1950 1 1 - 1 1 ? 9 9 .  1 It*, ti ' 1 . u
1955 1 1 . 7 13.  8 1 1 . 9 1 1 . 5 ;
1 9 6 0 1 1 . 7 1 3.  9 1 1 . 4 1 . r. ! 1 !
1965 i . o 1 6 .  7 1 1 . 8 i : . .  4 1
1 9 7 0 1 4 . 6 1 / . 6 14.  1 19.  . ! 1
1975 14.  O 1 / . 9 1 3 . 9 1 9 . 5 -
1978 1 5. 1 1 8 .  7 15.  3 '.o. .' ! -i
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T d b l e 5 . 4
Guatemala :  The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  in the  gr n-j-i d n w s l / , -
p roduct  Csf  the  m an u fac tu r in g  s e c t o r  -  1968.
( th ousan d s  o-f SCA)
n a t i o n a l  c ompanies - fo re ign  companies.
p ro d u c t i  on 
SCA */.
product  i n
s c a
F o o d  p r o d u c t s 251 :101801 .1 8 1 . 4 13 2 3 2 1 2 .4 1 8 .6
B e v e r a g e s 25 291 22.6 9 2 .  7 2 25*9 / . 3 7. :■
T o b a c c o 17 125. 1 1 . 0 2 1 5 5 9 8 .6 99 .  o
T e x t l 1e s 129 45 >6 5 .9 77. 4 1 13*38.8 - • V1
C l o t h i  ng 48 59 56. 1 8 9 .  1 1 4 B o . / l u . y
L e a t h e r 7 5 6 5 5 2 . 5 1OO. 0 -
Mood 09 8 1 6 4 . 9 lO u .  n -
P a p e r  and 69 1 2 3 8 1 .6 / 4 . 9 ’• 4 1 4 0 .9 3/ . 1
Ft  i  n t  i  ng Chem i c a 1 61 16447 . C.•J 4 2 . /  16 1 2 30 .4
I n d u s t r y  P e t r o l e u m — ' i 1 / 4 ’ * . 3
I n d u s t r y  R u b b e r 15 2 3 7 5 . ( » 1 5 .  / 13 1 ' 2 1
I n d u s t r y  F ' l a s t i c 18 5995. -* * '1 .5 ! - 1
l i l  a s s 6 4 3 8 .0 9 .  1 1 4 T -i. *
i n d u s t r y  Miner a 1 ■-» l 1 U 11, ..»> 99< y ' . 6 * ' .  '
m e ta l  l i e '  Mlner a l  *6 < met a 1 s ) 1 31 1850- / 5 6 . 9  1 »» 1 -l • • ' ».
Ut tier .1 192.1.6 9 9 . 4 l 134. o . r.
'4.
1 • >• ■ . ■ 
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■it! .'~r! **;; imp l it?s o f " f i n i l 1 t g f OUCl 1 ' 1 1 ' J 1 ' i ' / . Mi j - g Hi » hu .
loc a t ta 111 (j u a t lwti a 1 a to St?r yt- r<c an ' f 1 t i jf h i ncl * he
t a r i f f wai 1 ot the CACM and hencf on 1 •/ but t i l t  ig and inj nor
chemical additions occurred in the i.-'ua t ema 1 an plants. 
Similarly, foreign companies engaged in the ruhbei industry 
i. ontrol l ed 84. Z p e r c e n t  arid in trie g i a s. : ridust r yn.v 
percent of the production, yet perhaps the most impressive 
figure m  this table shows that nt least in I960, foreign 
companies (among them E;ixon, Gulf, fexaco, Koval Dutch 
Shell and Standard Oil of California! controlled 100 
percent of the petroleum industry in Guatemala. Guatemala 
is believed to have plentiful oil reserves and therefore 
several international oil companies in the 1970's 
concentrated on exploration for oil. The Luxembourg-based 
Basic Resources Internetional S.A has discovered oil on its 
936,000 acre petroleum concession in the Peten. This 
company's subsidiary, Recursos del Norte Ltda, cooperated 
in a joint venture with Shenandoah Oil Corporation and Saga 
Petroleum A/S of Norway to develop that concession.*1 Due 
to the limited size of the Guatemalan market, the companies 
had difficulty expanding and it was with much anticipation 
that they awaited the development of industries that 
required the intensive use of petroleum products. One such 
project was the proposed investment of the Canadian
International Nickel Company in the eastern part of the 
country. It was estimated that in a few years the 
investment should be $60-80 million - making it the largest
- I  to
industry' would be &«sentieil for ♦ he mining project's 
deve i  opment. aa
s i n g l e ?  l n v c 3 f mn nt  i n  G* <a t ^  cn«r* J <3 • M < 11 «r  a I ! /.  M i o  n r - t  r q  i sum
As cited in Table 5 of the previcts chapter, at least 
by 1963 direct foreign investment m  Guatemala concentrated 
in the manufacturing sector. Thin foreign investment had 
been called upon to be the engine tor industriali:»tion 
during the CACIi. In addition, one of the cams of the CACM 
sought to implement regional import substitution
industrial i:atmn through the i n ter r eg i on a 1 trade of 
manufactured goods. Indeed, Table b indicates that 9 I 
percent of Guatemala's exports to the CeCIi consisted of
manufactured products. In this analysis of foreign
investment we have looked to see the extent of its 
participation in the Guatemalan economy. Hence continuing 
m  this vein. Table S exposes the percentage o+ Guatemalan 
exports to the CACM that were produced b/ foreign
companies. In 1970 then 98.3 percent of the experts 
foreign companies were manufactured products and this 
accounted for 44.6 percent of the total manufactured items 
exported to the CACM. Despite their substantial presence 
one cannot say that foreign companies totally dominated the
interregional trade of Guatemala
Table 5.5
G u a t e m a l a :  Exports t o  t h e  Central A m e r i c a n  Common Mctrtet . i y '< *
expnr  t b f r o m  e x p o r t s  f rom
■ fo r e i g n  c o m p a n i e s  n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n i e s
P r o d u c t s  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t s
M jn u f  a c t  t i r e d  
p r o d u c t s
T o t a l
*C A  7- *C A  'I
758 ,0  51 1 .7  7 , 4 3 3 ,007  33 .3
9 .57. 9 0 . 77.
4 2 , 648,901  9 8 .5  5 5 , 0 6 6 .789  8 7 .8
4 4 . 6 7
4 3 , 406 ,952  
4 1. 87.
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Fi.e substantial investment ot foreign raujf.M in 
the manufacturing sector was likely to shift aftt»r the 
demise of the CACM. This is because as mentioned earlier, 
the bulk of the exports of foreign companies that grew and 
prospered during these years, was destined tor the Central 
American market. As interregional trade dwindled excess 
installed capacity in manufacturing industries swelled. 
This suggests that foreign investment would perhaps 
concentrate in a different sector. Hence it is interesting 
to examine in detail the investment of the Interneticnal 
Nickel Company <INCO) in Guatemala in the late 1970’u. This 
venture involved the exploitation of nonrenewable national 
resources and would be the single largest investment in 
Guatemala. An analysis of INCO in Guatemala gives one an 
idea of the future emphasis ot development, of how the 
Guatemalan leadership is likely to handle the relationship 
with foreign investment, and it shows a new and more 
sophisticated strategy on the part of foreign companies 
when compared with the past record of foreign investors, 
(For this following section Z have relied heavily on the 
book, The Pio.-N icke l I.INCQ at Home and Abroad, by Jamie 
Swift and the Development Education Centre.)
INCO IN GUATEMALA
In 1956 the Hanna Mining Company of Cleveland secured a 
concession on the shores of Lake Izabal in Guatemala from 
the government of Colonel Carlas Castillo Armas. Wanting
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perhaps to share the risls in developing t.heee deposits. 
Hanna turned over control to the Internet 1 onal Nickel 
Company (INCO), Canada's largest mining company and the 
world's largest producer of nickel, in 1960. A new company, 
E;:pl oraci ones y E>:pl otaci ones Mi nor as (EXMIBAL) , was 
incorporated in which Hanna retained onlv percent of the 
equity in EXMIBAL, and INCO tool up the remaining 8<> 
percent.*3
By the summer of 1962, EXMIBAL was technically ready to 
begin the mine development. However, its mining project was 
not officially dedicated until July of 1977. During these 
years, the parent companies undertook what they felt was 
the "political work" necessary before production could 
begi n.**
First of all, pressure was brought upon the Ydigoras 
government to adopt a new mining code. B' before an 
agreement could be reached, Ydigoras was overthrown and 
Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia seized control and 
suspended the constitution. EXMIBAL was interested m  
encouraging the establishment of comprehensive mining 
legislation and it hired a Peruvian engineer to draft such 
a code. In April 1965, the Quatemalan Congress passed this 
draft as Decree 342 and in four months EXMIBAL had obtained 
the rights to the Niquegua nickel deposits in the hills 
overlooking Lake Izabal.*•
Next, EXMIBAL desired to have its strip mining 
operation classified as a transformation industry. It would
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then benefit from the tax incpntt vt*! the bu.at* ‘m.ni c»n 
government offered as part of the Common Market strategy to 
attract industrial investment. When EXMIBAL requested this 
special status in 1967, the Minister of the Economy at the 
time, Roberto Barillas Izaguirre rejected it citing that 
only non-metal 1ic mineral operations could qualify for 
transformation industry status.** Hence the mining company 
commissioned the industrial research arm of the CALM, 
ICAITT, to do a special study. ICAITT recommended that the 
Guatemalan government bestow the special status upon 
EXMIBAL. And in May 1968, with a new Minister of the 
Economy, EXMIBAL was declared eligible for special tax 
treatment.*T
Still INCO wished to secure the ability of EXMIBAL to 
repatriate profits without initially depositing export 
earnings in the Guatemalan Central Bank as had been the
custom. EXMIBAL claimed that in order to amortize the
foreign loans for investment it must be allowed to
accumulate a capital fund outside of Guatemala. On March 
29, 1968, the government's Resolution 5727 ruled that 
companies with large foreign debts could deposit their 
funds outside the country.**
After securing these concessions that seemingly would 
assure them of a profitable experience in Guatemala, INCO 
sought one more last assurance of a good investment climate 
in Guatemala. INCO wanted proof from the government of firm 
control over political opposition that might endanger
i n v e s t m e n t .
Throughout the mid sixties, the hili^ around L*ke 
Izabal were the base for eft-wing guerrillas. The fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) and the Movimiento Revoluctunar 1 o 13 
de noviembre (MR 13) had established a base of support 
among the peasants of the provinces of Irabal and Zacapa. 
According to the authors of The Bid Nicfel. just as the U.S 
had made Guatemala safe for democracy in lVb4, Colonel 
Carlos Arana Osorio made Izabal and Zacapa safe for 1NC0 m  
1968. In 1968, Arana Osorio and his Arnerican-trained and 
armed soldiers launched a "pacification campaign" to 
destroy the guerillas - by the end of the decade and this 
exercise, 3000 Guatemalans had been killed, many of them 
peasant supporters of the opposition. On the strength of 
his "performance" Arana Osorio ran for the presidency and 
was elected in 1970. He pledged during the campaign that, 
"If I am elected, all Guatemala will be like Zacapa". After 
his victory EXMIBAL was finally ready to proceed and in 
February, 1971 an agreement was signed.30 A complex capable 
of producing 60 million pounds of nickel per year was to be 
built at a cost of $250 million.
According to INC0, the agreement brought "together 
certain conditions contained in the laws of Guatemala and 
other conditions contained mutually agreed upon..."31 The 
company agreed to pay half the usual 53 percent tax on 
mining operations for the first five years of production 
and 3/4 the usual rate for the following five years. In
addition, probably thK- most touted ispect at tht? aarcement 
was the provision for government participation in the 
mining project through an acquisition of up to ;.0 percent 
of EXMIBAL, the equity of which would accrue in lieu of 
taxes.3* The authors of The B iq Nickel . suggest that the 
state involvement in EXMIBAL may have been an effort to 
appease those in Guatemala who were reminded of the 
country’s experience with UFCO and saw it as a sell-out of 
non-renewable national resources, or an effort attempting 
to secure the company against the threat of 
nationalization.
INCO secured financing for the project from various 
international agencies, and in the end roughly one quarter 
of the necessary capital came from government agencies in 
the form of export credits or from lending institutions 
which received most of their funding from industrial 
countries.33
In May 1969 an ad hoc group of academics, unionists, 
and oppostion political leaders convened a public inquiry 
into the agreements with EXMIBAL. They offered the 
following recommendations concerning the Lake Izabal 
projects A new mining code to replace the "INCO code" 
passed in 1965 should be devised. EXMIBAL should also be 
taxed directly so that for each ton of ore extracted the 
government should receive some payment. In addition other 
national companies should be allowed to bid on the project, 
or it might even be run as a state enterprise. Furthermore,
he dec i• ion tc < t i i aw F MI F h L to r e p tyri.itf' tnei r pr of i t s
freely should be r ©versed as lt went gainst current
policy. Final y « EXMIBAL should be denied status as a
transformation industry.9* !n response to other instances 
of growing discontent, Arana Osorio ordered his Minister of 
the Economy to review the concessions granted to INCG's 
subsidiary. This minister, a former employee of EXMIBAL, 
not iuprisingly, could find no fault with the agreements.913
Fulfilling his campaign promise to do to Guatemala what 
he had done to Zacapa, Arana Osorio declared a state of 
siege in November 1970. The suspension ot normal legal 
rights allowed increased offical repression and an increase 
in the activities of right wing death squads.9* Some of the 
most vocal critics of the EXMIBAL deal were victims of the 
terror of these years. Alfonso Bauer Pais, a law professor 
and member of the ad hoc commission was shot by assai1 ants 
but survived. In that same month another member of the 
commission, Julio Carney Herrera was machine-gunned to death 
in his car. Two months later, Adolfo Mijangos, the foremost 
critic of the project, and one of the four opposition 
deputies elected that year, was murdered just before the 
final agreement between Guatemala and INCO was signed.
In July 1977, EXMIBAL was officially dsdicated by then 
president General Kjell Laugerud. The Guatemalan government 
saw the project as a model of foreign investment for it not 
only opened up a new export sector, but the fact that INCO 
was Canadian represented a change from the usually obvious
L 24-
Aini r icdin presence. The extractive part ot the cuer^t ion was 
st ip mining. Power shovels scooped away the hills in 22 
foot strips and 35 ton trucks hauled the ore to the 
processing plant on the shores of Lake tzabal. After the 
ore was reduced and melted* the nickel matte was shipped 
down the Lake and eventually to the Caribbean port ot Santo 
Tomas where it was shipped to the countries that refined 
nickel. EXMIBAL was expected to be exportinq by the end of 
the year and when operating at full capacity to employ 900 
people. Critics of the project saw little if no benefits 
for the Guatemalan people. In term* of creating i o o s , the 
anticipated staff of 900 seemed insigniflcant compared to 
the 20 percent unemployed. and the 50 percent 
underemployed, of the population of five million. In 
addition to the criticism of the company's regulation of 
rate of resource extraction, control ot marketing and 
pricing, concern was expressed over the effect of strip 
mining on the ecology of the Lake Izabal region. It seemed 
that the only Guatemalans that would gain from this venture 
were those who allied themselves directly to the 
transnational. These people were often members of the most 
influential families ir banking, agriculture and business.
Notes In January 1981, the much awaited mine shut down 
for a year due to low nickel prices and the high cost of 
oil used in the smelting process. At its peak the mine had 
brought in about as much foreign exchange as the entire 
tourist industry.**'
it has been shown that the Cf^CM member nations fixed 
upon foreign investment to spur their programs tor 
industrialization. To this end they actively competed 
against each other in efforts to attract foreign capital. 
In most cases however, the desire for lndustr1 aiizat 1 on 
co-existed with strong nationalistic and often, 
anti-American sentiments. So in Central America ambivalent 
feelings that encouraged foreign investment, to raise the 
national income, and feared that such investment would be 
costly in economic and social terms and impair independence 
prevai1ed.*• Wilkins below, recognizes these fears that 
exist in all of Latin America (and are definitely 
representative of the Guatemalan experience), in responding 
to each one, she speaks for the good that multinationals 
could accomplish.
First, recipient nations fear the economic costs of U.S 
investment. By takinQ large earnings out of the country and 
in other ways hurting the nation's balance of payments, U.S 
investment would retard economic growth and local 
initiative as it sought to aid the parent company's growth 
at the expense of the national economy. Wilkins counters 
that payments abroad by U.S business contributed positively 
to the host nation's growth. For instance, it would provide 
capital, management, technology, skills and know-how, 
employment opportunities and taxable enterprise. In 
addition, basic infrastructure investments in
transportc»tion, housing, education and medical care dr . 
benefits to the host country. With respect to fluctuate 
in the nation's balance of payments. Will ins states t 
the effects could be positive when a foreign invest 
production was substituted for imports and when t 
investors exported their output, ns far as sapping io <1 
initiative, she maintains that by demonstratinq technique 
that could be imitated, by training indigenous personnel 
and by creating new activities (secondary industries) 
linked with the investor’s primary business, host nation 
local business could prosper. Albert 0. Hirschman concedes 
that foreign capital is now taxed more heavily, more 
foreign earnings are returned to the host country, foreign 
firms buy more from and sell more to domestic producers, 
and technology is being transfered. However, the 
performance of foreign capital today is still overshadowed 
by the "conspicuous cases of unbrindled exploitation in the 
past. Today the U.S is still accused of economic 
domination, political intervention and perversion of Latin 
American values through their investmnts.>>9* On the 
question of economic costs of foreign investment, Wilkins 
concludes that the record shows that it has helped the 
national economyi
There need be no contradiction between aiding the 
parent company's and the host nation's growth* both can 
go hand in hand. In net, U.S business abroad usually 
has made an important contribution to the economic
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growth ot the host nation.*0
Again Hirschman agrees that foreign investment can 
bring in missing factors of production (capital, 
management, technology, skills etc.) complementary to those 
available locally in the early stages of development of a 
poor country. However, once a country has started to 
generate its own entrepeneurs, and technicians, foreign 
investment may play a stunting role as it keeps importing 
so called scarce factors of production.*1 As Guatemala 
appears to have reached this stage of development it seems 
that foreign firms may compete with rather than complement 
domestic enterprise. When solvent local businesses are 
bought out it is hard to continue talking about 
contr 1 but ions. In Wilkin's opihi on, the major contribution 
foreign investors have made has been their role in the 
industrialization of Latin America. Further, the most 
modern parts of the industrial sec- or in Latin America 
result from U.S stakes. Certainly this is likely to be 
true. However, when investors own the most modern parts of 
the industrial sector, then often the very core of a 
national economy is controlled by other than national 
interests - a situation which seems hard to justify. These 
industrialists cannot usually constitute an effective 
interest group tor modernization as foreigners tend to act 
with caution and restraint and not as a pressure group for 
the reform of domestic policies.4* It is hard to imagine 
why they would want to changs domestic policies that
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granted them various concessions. The liu.-ttem.al an experience 
with foreign investment, supports this. UFCU, before the 
election of Arbens controlled not only a vast amount of the 
country”* most fertile land, but it also its transports 1 on 
systems both inside Guatunala and outside (in terms of 
shipping). In addition its subsidiaries owned the country's 
public utilities and communications system. No one has ever 
asserted that UFCQ ever acted to change chis status quo , 
certainly, their success at resisting such attempts it well 
documented. Later INCQ's nickel mining project, one of the 
most recent end largest foreign investments in Guatemala, 
only sought to expand the concessions that they received 
from the national government and did not proceed until they 
were secured. In addition, when policy makers make 
decision*, affecting key industrial sectors, the fruits of 
their decisions accrue to non-nationals and hence just 
further strengthen their position.** It is therefore 
difficult to make national decisions that concern economic 
development.
Next the Latin American countries that hosted direct 
foreign investment feared its political costui the creation 
of dependent relationships and the loss of sovereignty. In 
this light there were many critical questions they faced. 
What about the loyalties of multinational corporations. Are 
they responsive first to the U.8 government and then to the
h o s t  g o ve r n me n t ,  f i - , t  t o  t h e  pa r e nt :omp.:<n ,* dnd ♦’hen to
the host nation0 If the foreign investment is in an 
important industry or another preeminent role in the 
economy, Mill it be able to circumvent national goals"* Can 
any nation retain its sovereignty it its najor industry, 
its national defense, its communication, its transport, or 
its banking activities are in foreign hands" '  Can foreign 
investors upset a national currency''
Mil kins responds to these deep concerns by countering 
that nations that host direct foreign private investment 
can indeed maintain their sovereignty. These host nations 
have the power to enact laws (tax and expropriation) to 
control the activities of foreign investors. As far as the 
loyalties of foreign investment and its circumvention of 
national goals. Mil kins believes that compared with the 
alternative of foreign government capital, private foreign 
direct investment is free of political strings as they have 
economic goals behind their investment. In addition, 
Wilkins contends that there cannot be true national 
sovereignty without economic strength - and foreign 
investors aid in establishing this foundation. Actually the 
record in Guatemala shows that there have been no 
expropriations since 1955, and although tax laws might 
control the activities of foreign investors, in Guatemala 
this has not been their aim. Rather, tax incentives and tax 
breaks have been used to attract more capital to Guatemala. 
In addition, not only did the host nations seem unable to
*n.rtct laws that control 1 ed foreign : n vest men t, but 
companies 1 1 he UFCO and EXIilBAL proved adept at influencing 
the passage of laws that favored their particular needs. 
Although it might be correct that m  itself private 
investment had less political strings. we have seen how 
since the administrat 1 on of Woodrow Wilson, government aid 
has increasingly been implemented to protect and provide 
guarantees for private investment. Much of their aid money 
was used to build infrastructure that would be of qroat 
assistance to these new industries, The idea that there is 
no linkage between private foreign direct investment and 
foreign capital seems questionable given these developments 
since the days of Wilson.
Lastly,, host nations feared the social costs of direct 
foreign investment. They worried that the multinational 
firms would impose alien cultural patterns and hence 
destroy the nation's culture. Wilkins does not appear to 
challenge these concerns, rather she seems to confirm thr.n 
and accept their inevitability.
...economic development, particularly industrialination 
wherever it occurs, decimates old cultural patterns. 
The question is, does the recipient nation want to 
develop| if so it must sacrifice many of the existing 
ways of life. There seems no choice. No nation has 
developed economically without some crumbling of the 
cake of custom.**
The implication of the above statement is that
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industrialization is a set paclaq€j - t:nnt'iimm) sueiitir: 
policies, skills, and technology that must unflinchingly he 
implemented if a society decides to seek greater economic 
development. I cannot agree that the destruction of a 
culture so rich and colorful as that of Guatemala should be 
accepted as an inevitable consequence of modernization. 
Economic development must be an illusion without the 
foundation of an educated, healthv and proud society.
In a number of cases. Mil kin's views on the economic, 
political and social consequences of foreign investment in 
Latin America, conflict with what we know about its record 
in Guatemala.
According to Wilkins, J.S business abroad has made 
important contributions to th<# economic growth of the host 
nation. It has provided crucial factors of production like 
capital, management, technology, know-how, skills etc... 
Also it provides employment opportunities, beneficial 
additions to the national infrastructure and taxable 
enterprises. In the case of Guatemala, as many of the 
foreign investments were capital intensive, the IDB’s 
Annual Report stated in I960 that the new investments 
created about 1,500 new jobs a year, while the increase in 
t.ie national labor force amounted to 80,000 persons a 
year.** As far as the creation of taxable enterprise is 
concerned, we have seen how in the case of two major 
foreign investments, UFCQ and EXMIBAL, taxes were reduced 
in some cases bv one half, or even eliminated all together.
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Or. the contrary, revenue declined as buatemala srni.fht
to attract foreign companies. She stated that the balance 
of payments effects due to foreign investment could be
p o s i t i v e  as the f o r e i g n 1 n v e s to r s p roduct ion cou ld  be
s u b s t i t u t e d fo r imports . Actua l  1v. the on ly time that
Guatemala’s balance of payments was positive was during the 
last few years of Ardens’s regime. Rather than weakening 
local capital Wilkins countered that foreign investors 
bolster their initiative by demonstrating new techniques 
that can be imitated, bv training native personnel and by 
stimulating the creation at complementary, secondary 
industries that could supply the needs of the larger 
industry. As mentioned by Hirschman, it is questionable 
whether foreign firms did not just compete (with an unfair 
advantage) with already established local entrepeneurs. 
Lastly she believed that one of the major contr 1 butions of 
foreign investment was its creation of the most modern and 
industrial sectors of Latin America. *n the case of 
Guatemala probably one of the major detriments of foreign 
investment was exactly this, since the days of United Fruit 
it controlled most of the key industrial sectors, indeed 
the very core of the national economy.
As far as the political consequences of foreign 
investment Wilkins seemed assured that local sovereignty 
could be maintained since host nations had the power to 
enact laws that would control foreign investors. Again, the 
Guatemalan experience shows that those laws that were
enacted either, gave ta;; breaks and incentives to foreign 
companies during the period of the CACM, nr as m  the case 
of UFCO and EXMIBAL these companies were* actually able to 
influence the passing of legislation in their favor, 
Wilkins did not feel that Latin American nations should 
worry about whether foreign companies would be more loyal 
to the parent company and the U.S government than to the 
local authorities. After all she asserted, private foreign 
direct investment was purely motivated by economic goals 
and free of political strings. The record m  Guatemala 
indicates that this is nonsense. Of course the best example 
of foreign investment with political strings was UFCO, who 
after being threatened by expropriation and other changes 
in their way of doing business, was able to play a major 
role in the overthrow of the elected government of Arbens 
in 1954, In regard to political costs, Wilkins concludes 
that true notional sovereignty was not possible without the 
economic strength that foreign companies could provide. v*t 
how could a nation like Guatemala retain its sovereignty 
(if it ever had it) when its major industry, its national 
defense, its communications, its transport, or its banking 
activities are in foreign hands? Would foreign investors 
ever allow the nationalization of these interests when they 
attained this foundation of economic strength? Lastly, in 
terms of social consequences, Wilkins held that in order to 
achieve economic development some destruction of the 
national culture must be accepted. Certainly in Guatemala
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during the past twenty years "old cultural patterns" have 
been decimated, especially those of the large Indian 
population. Yet it appears that this grave loss has not 
been accompanied by any great measure of development as 
indicators ot social, political and economic modernization 
will show.
In order to analyze some of the current social 
conditions in Guatemala I have gathered data in fable 6 
from the Inter-American Development Bank Annual Reports of 
the last twenty years. While advances appear to have been 
made in reducing the death rate and infant mortality and 
increasing the life expectancy and literacy rate, other 
measures of social well-being such as central government 
expenditures on education, public health and housing have 
declined. These figures become more meaningful when 
compared with strides other Latin American nations have 
made in these areas.
It would seem impossible for any study of Guatemala to 
ignore this country’s recent record of violent political 
unrest. I feel that Jonathan Fried’s book Guatemala in 
Robollioni Unfiniahod Himtorv includo* . chronology that 
summarizes the political situation since 1954. (See 
Appendix 1). Unfortunately, entries that would indicate an 
opening of the political process to a larger sector of the 
population, fair elections, or the confidence of the 
Guatemalan people in their elected government, are
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c on sp 1 1 absent in this tragic litanv of political 
violence ar Jestruction -if the Indian culture. Apparently* 
political jEvelopment has not accompanied the economic 
growth of the past thirty years.
Indicators of economic advances in these years can be 
found in Tables 7, 8, and 9. The years after 1954 
'dominated by the CACM period) are characterized bv healthy 
growth rates when compared to the rest of Central America. 
Although the war in 1969 signaled the decline of the CACIi. 
the resulting deceleration in the industrial sector was 
compensated by a rise in the world commodity prices after 
1971. It is interesting to note that despite two decades of 
concerted efforts by such programs as the CACM and the 
Alliance for Progress to encourage industrialization, the 
export agriculture sector did not relinquish its dominance 
as shown in Tr.ble 8. Also in Table 9 it appears that the 
expansion of this sector ltd to increased export warnings 
for Guatemala that were not so much a result of increased 
productivity as of a greater cultivated area. Indeed9 from 
1950 to 1980 the area planted in cotton increased by 2307 
percent as compared to a much smaller increase in yield. 
Since 1979 the economic crisis that had betn threatening 
for years finally took hold.
In contemplating the deteriorated economic and 
financial condition of the last five years in Guatemala
(Table 10), the 1984 Interamerican Development Bank Annual
T a b l e  7 .  R a t e  o f  G r o w t h  o f  G r ^ s s  D c n e s t i P r o d u c t  a t  
1950 p r i c e s .
( R a t e s  e x p r e s s e d  a s  g e o m e t r i c  a n n u a l
a v e r a g e s )
P e r  i od
C o s t a
R i c a
E l
S a l v a d o r
G u a t e  
mal a H o n d u r a s N i c a r a g u a
1 9 2 0 -4 3 . 0 4 .  3 5 . 4 0 . 5 1 . 9
1 9 2 4 -9 0 . 2 2 . 6 3 . 8 8 . 3 6 .  4
1 9 2 9 -3 4 0 . 0  - O. 7 - 0 . 6 - 2 . 4 - 4 . 9
1 9 3 4 -9 8 .  O 3 . 3 1 2 .5 0 . 2 2 .  4
1 9 3 9 -4 4 - 2 .  7 3 . 5 - 4 .  7 2 . 4 4 .  £>
1 9 4 4 -9 1 0 . 9 6 . 8 6 . 9 5 .  3 6 .  9
1 9 4 9 -5 4 5 .  1 3 . 8 3 . 5 2 . 0 1 1 . 3
1 9 5 4 -9 4 .  1 3 .  2 4 . 9 5 .  1 3. 1
1 9 5 9 -6 4 3 . 9 7 . 2 5 . 0 3 . 9 6 .  8
1 9 6 4 -9 7 . 8 4 . 7 5 . 5 4 . 5 5 . 5
1 9 6 9 -7 4 7. 1 4 . 9 6 . 4 3 . 5 5 .  4
1 9 7 4 -9 5 .  4 3 . 5 5 . 3 5 . 2 - 4 .  7
1 9 7 9 -8 2 - 1 . 2 8 .  1 0 . 8 0 . 5 4.  9
C S o u r c e : Thomas l n  JLAS v o l . 1 5 p a r t  2 N ovem ber  19833
fabl© 8, Export Earnings from Agriculture and Industry, 
1970-1978 (millions of dollars)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
6______9______r______i c______u______1______ t._____ u r _e
Coffee
100.6 96. 3 105.3 145.6 173.0 164.2 243.0 526.5 455.0
Cotton
27.2 26.0 40.9 47.9 71.0 75.9 87.8 152. 1 161.6
B.n.n*.
13.6 14.4 25.7 24.7 31.4 35. 1 45.7 45.6 49.9
Sugar
9.2 9.9 16. 1 21.9 49.6 115.6 106. 7 81.8 28.6
Beef
12.7 17.4 18. 1 25. 1 21.5 17.0 14.5 27.9 27.5
Othnr
22. 1 17.7 18.4 23.4 34. 3 22.0 57.6 69.9 80.0
TOTAL
185.2 181.6 224.5 288.6 380. 8 429.7 555.:2 903.7 602.6
As 7. of al 1 
62.3 63.3 66.8 65.5 65.4 67.0 70.8 76.7 69.2
exports
Indumtrv.
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Manufacture
107,5 101.8 107.4 146.4 193. 1 203. 1 221.7 267.8 341.5
hln.r.l.
4.0 3.4 3.9 6.6 8.4 8.2 7.5 7.3 16.3
TOTAL
112.0 105.2 111.3 153.0 201.5 211.3 229.2 275.1 357.8 
As % of all
37.7 36.7 33.2 34.5 34.6 33.0 29.2 23.3 30.8
exports
[Sources World Bank, 1980 from NACLA vol XVII n o . U
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•peaks of the prospects for a gradual recovery in the next 
few years.
The Annual Report mentions the factors that they feel 
have accounted for the estimated 2 percent contraction of 
the Guatemalan economy in 1983. and sees hope for their 
improvement. Dependence on the world prices for their 
traditional export products, Guatemala has been seriously 
affected by their low levels of the past years. Coffee 
exports, which account for 30 percent of the total exports, 
amounted to $308 million in 1983, which meant a decline of 
18 percent from 1982. Earnings from cotton fell 20 percent 
to $77 million in 1983 and banana exports, plagued by bad 
weather, decreased by 26 percent. The value of sugar sales 
however, almost doubled.4* Another factor in the Guatemalan 
crisis is the decline in public expenditures. Public sector 
investment, affected by a government austerity program, 
fell another 15 percent after a reduction of 20 percent in 
1982.47 Lastly, private investment, due to tight credit, 
limited access to foreign exchange and political 
uncertainty, has continued its decline,4*
It is interesting to note that in these authors’ 
assessment of the potential recovery of these three factors 
and hence the Guatemalan recovery, they continue to put the 
emphasis on the role of export agriculture paralleled with 
private investment.
Rep ort, Economic and Social Proarens 1 n uatjLj} rtmfrjpa,
-141-
Prospects of some recovery in the external demand for 
traditional exports may prevent a further eco- nomic 
decline in 1984 and contribute to a very gradual 
recovery in the following years. The pro* jected 
performance assumes restraint in public expenditures 
and a modest recovery of private investment in a 
climate of relative political stabi11 ty...The policy of 
keeping public expenditure in check means that the 
prospective economic recovery depends mainly on private 
investment and external demand. The conficence of the 
private sector may be strengthened by the announcement 
that a National Assembly is to be elected in mid- 1984 
to draft a new constitution and presidential elections 
are to be held in early 1985.**
Due to the focus of this paper on foreiqn investment 
special attention should be takf^n on this key role that the 
Annual Report hopes that the private investment sector will 
take in Guatemala. In the past 20 years, the growth in 
direct private investment concentrated in manufacturing 
industries. Gut they do not anticipate that in the future 
major investments will remain here because of various 
reasons. First of all, at present there is an excess 
installed c a p a c i t y . Thl* «•**** •• •***• mmmxi
of the market that grew saturated by the abundancy of 
industrial investors who were drawn in the past years to 
take advantage of the special incentives that have been 
discussed throughout the paper. The other reason for no
expected dynamic growth in investment in the manufacturing 
industry is the collapse of the main outlet for Guatemalan 
goods. It has been mentioned that the bulk of the products 
of Guatemalan industry were destined for the regional 
markets of Central America. Hence the current unsettled 
economic and political situation in this area has affected 
the future of that industry.*1
Rather, the Annual Report sees that major private 
investment opportunities in 19B4 lying in the energy 
sector, offshore assembly operations, and agro-industrial 
projects.** Guatemala is believed to have considerable 
untapped oil wealth. However, they are a high cost producer 
of oil primarily due to high exploration costs and 
difficult production conditions. As in the past, in order 
to stimulate further activity in the oil sector, the 
Guatemalan government has turned to foreign private 
investment. In September of 1983, it approved new 
legislation designed to make foreign investment in oil 
exploration and production more attractive.** According 
to the Annual Report, the agro-industrial sector seems to 
be in a good position for "industrial expansion and 
diversification of industrial exports (based chiefly on the 
processing of natural resources). Given labor intensive 
operations they may be in a position to compete in the 
international market. At the same time, the reactivation of 
the world economy and the Caribbean Basin Initiative are 
likely to facilitate industrial recovery in the
- 1 4 3 -
country. "®*
"Political uncertainty" seems to be a rather mild term 
to describe the litany of violence given in the chronology 
of political modernization. If this critical situation can 
be remedied by national elections as the 1984 
Inter-American Development Bank Annual Report suggests, 
then great strides would have been made in the democratic 
system of Guatemala. It is interesting to note the path 
toward economic and financial recovery is to be funded 
again through substantial private foreign investment. Given 
Guatemala’s past history with the United Fruit Company 1  ^
is perhaps not surprising that the Annual Report emphasize! 
that " industrial expansion and diversification of
industrial exports (based chiefly on the processing of
national resources" is the key to future prosperity in that 
country. Although today the strategy of foreign capital is 
more sophisticated (the example of EXMIBAL), and although 
Guatemala experienced thirty years of strenuous efforts to 
undergo industrialization on a regional scale and lessen 
its dependence on the export of basic raw materials, it
appears that very little has changed in Guatemala’s
relationship with foreign investors, and in the composition 
of the country’s exports.
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Conclusion.
Forsign investors in Guatemala in the first half of the 
20th century primarily engaged in the cultivation and 
exportation of coffee. Dominated by Germans and their 
Guatemalan descendants, this sector's exports became 
responsible for the bulk of the country's revenue. 
Gradually the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which began the 
cultivation of bananas, surpassed the German influence so 
that by the end of the first World War North American 
capital had assumed the dominant position. As has been 
demonstrated in this study, the power of the UFCO in 
Guatemala can scarcely be exaggerated. The UFCO along with 
the International Railways of Central America (IRCA) and 
the Empresa Electrica gained control of vast plantations 
and virtually the only means of modern transportation in 
the country and thus secured undisputed economic and 
political power. As the Guatemalan treasury grew totally 
dependent on the export of coffee and bananas <it is 
estimated that by the 1920's these two crops accounted for 
more than 90 percent of the export earnings) these two 
powers were impregnable. During the Ubico regime, the elite 
sector (agrarian oligarchy) of Guatemalan society willingly 
gave great advantages and Independence to these three North 
American multinational companies who invested in expanding 
Guatemala's export market and infrastructure. Guatemala has 
never abandoned the export-led model of growthf with rare
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e xp e c ta tio n s  t h is  modal p ro v id e d  the  source o f growth in  
the Guatemalan economy s in c e  the  1920’ s . The a g ra ria n  
o lig a rc h y  b e n e fite d  from the c o u n try ’ s e x p o rts  o f c o f fe e , 
bananas, sugar and cotton  and the  grow ing in te rn a t io n a l 
m arket. In the 1950’ s the market f lu c tu a t io n s  had
in c re a s in g ly  been n e g a tive  and both t h is  e l i t e  se c to r o f 
landowners and Guatem ala’ s n a t io n a l is t ic  le a d e rs  (who had 
overthrow n Ubico in  1944) thought th a t an expanded and 
d iv e r s i f ie d  e xp o rt market c o u ld  be b e n e f ic ia l .  An
in d u s t r ia l  p o l ic y  based on the d is t r ib u t io n  o f b e n e f its  to  
a l l  s e c to rs  of s o c ie ty  was a ve rte d  by re v o lu t io n  in  1954. 
In s te a d , the  p o l ic y  became im port s u b s t itu t io n  at th e  
re g io n a l le v e ls  th e  C en tra l American Common Market (CACM)• 
The CACM, founded in  1960 to  in s p ir e  economic
development o f the  re g io n  through f re e  in te r re g io n a l tra d e  
and economic in te g r a t io n , stands out as the most su c c e ssfu l 
in te g ra t io n  movement o f L a t in  America and perhaps o f any 
o th e r de ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s . The f in a n c ia l  re so u rc e s
re q u ire d  by th e  Common M arket’ s in d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  scheme 
were p ro v id e d  m a in ly  by the U n ited  S ta te s . A s u b s ta n t ia l 
in c re a se  in  U .S fo re ig n  d ir e c t  in ve stm e nt, now concentrated  
p r im a r i ly  in  m anufacturing in d u s t r ie s ,  p a ra l le le d  t h is  
fu n d in g . Alm ost im m ediately th e re  were s ig n s  th a t the  CACM 
was an economic success i f  measured in  term s o f growth in  
in te r re g io n a l t ra d e , and ye t a d isappointm ent by o th e r 
in d ic a to rs  o f economic developement such as a more
e q u ita b le  d is t r ib u t io n  o f land  and income and le s s
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dependence on th® w orld  economy. W ith few r e s t r ic t io n s  on 
fo re ig n  investm ent and in te n se  co m p e titio n  among member 
n a tio n s  to  a t t ra c t  t h is  in d u s t r ia l  c a p ita l many p la n ts  were 
e s ta b lis h e d . Problems arose  fo r  each C en tra l American host 
n a t io n 's  balance of payments as the m anufacturing 
in d u s t r ie s  pa id  low er taxes but re q u ire d  in c re a s in g ly  
expensive  im ported m a te ria ls  and c a p ita l goods th a t had to  
be fin a nced  by the t r a d it io n a l  e xp o rt a g r ic u ltu r a l  p roducts  
th a t fe tched  a decreasing  pric«> in  in te rn a t io n a l m arkets. 
The Common Market as a whole encountered problem s as 
m anufacturing in d u s t r ie s  concentrated  in  the c o u n tr ie s  w ith  
a la rg e r  in d u s t r ia l  base9 c re a t in g  resentm ent in  c o u n tr ie s  
l ik e  Honduras and N icaragua th a t f e l t  th e y  were being 
fo rce d  to  s u b s id iz e  the  p ro te c te d  in d u s t r ie s  o f Guatemala, 
Costa R ica and Cl S a lva d o r. F urtherm ore , the typ e s  of goods 
produced by these in d u s t r ie s  fo r  t h is  re g io n a l market o f 15 
m il l io n  were l i k e l y  to  be in a c c e s ib le  to  much o f the  
econ om ica lly  a c t iv e  C e n tra l American p o p u la t io n , two t h ir d s  
o f which was engaged in  a g r ic u lt u r e .  The CACM never 
attem pted to  address th e  need fo r  land re fo rm  in  these 
c o u n tr ie s  where e xp o rt a g r ic u ltu r e  continued to  dom inate. 
In 1969 as the s e v e r i t y  o f these  problem s mounted, any 
p ro g re ss  the  CACM had achieved was s ta l le d  by the  war 
between E l S a lvador and Honduras. C r i t i c s  have m aintained 
th a t some o f the  f a i l u r e  o f the CACM re s u lte d  from the 
d e s ire s  o f  such groups as the  U .8 governm ent, in v e s to rs  and 
th e  landed e l i t e  o f C e n tra l America to  ach ieve  in d u s t r ia l
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m odern ity w h ile  a vo id in g  s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  as in  
Cuba* The A ll ia n c e  fo r  P ro g re ss , another e f f o r t  of the U.S 
government d u rin g  the 1960’ s to  he lp  C en tra l America 
achieve  ecnomic and s o c ia l development w h ile  m a in ta in in g  
dem ocratic governm ent, re s u lte d  in  the growth of p r iv a te  
d ire c t  fo re ig n  investm ent as the  CACM had and was s im i la r l y  
c r i t i c i z e d .
In  Guatemala, as in  the re s t  o f C e n tra l Am erica, in  the  
s ix t ie s  and s e v e n tie s , the ye a rs  of the CACM and the 
A ll ia n c e  fo r  P ro g re ss , the  g a in s  o f m u lt in a tio n a l 
c o rp o ra tio n s  in  the m anufacturing and m ining in d u s t r ie s  
co n tra ste d  w ith  th e  u n f u l f i l l e d  hopes fo r  a more e q u ita b le  
d is t r ib u t io n  of land and income, fo r  h e a lth  and e ducation a l 
improvem ents, fo r  le s s  p o l i t i c a l  v io le n c e  and fo r  more 
open, dem ocratic governm ents, as w ell as le s s  dependence on 
the w orld  economy. As d iscussed in  Chapter F iv e , t h is  
s itu a t io n  sparked a debate as to  whether fo re ig n  investm ent 
was good o r bad fo r  these n a t io n s . The r e s u lt s  o f t h is  
stu dy  do not suggest e ith e r  a b so lu te  c o n c lu s io n .
H is t o r ic a l l y  in  Guatemala, a l l  e f f o r t s  at a c h ie v in g  
economic development have depended h e a v ily  on fo re ig n  
investm ents the in c o rp o ra t io n  in to  the w orld  market of 
e xp o rt a g r ic u ltu r e ,  th e  b u ild in g  o f modern t ra n s p o rta t io n , 
communication and power system s, the  C e n tra l American 
Common Market, the  A ll ia n c e  f o r  P rog ress and the  c re a t io n  
of modern in d u s t r ie s  in  the  m anufacturing , m ineral and 
energy s e c to rs . S t a t is t ic s  show th a t fo re ig n  investm ent
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alone has not been able  to  achieve p ro p o rt io n a l r e s u lt s  in  
terms of economic, s o c ia l ,  and p o l i t ic a l  developm ent. The 
s im i la r i t ie s  between the r e s u lt s  of the  la rg e s t fo re ig n  
investm ent in  Guatemala i n the f i r s t  h a lf  of the 20th 
c e n tu ry , the U nited F r u it  Company, and the la rg e st fo re ig n  
investm ent in  recent ye a rs , EXNIBAL, dem onstrate how l i t t l e  
has changed. The years have o n ly  re s u lte d  in  the more 
s o p h is tic a te d  manner that EXTHBAL used to  secure the 
concessions i t  de s ire d  from the government. Although 
through these years fo re ig n  investm ent has p rovided  scarce 
fa c to rs  of p roduction  such am c a p it a l ,  technology and 
know-how, th is  study suggests that fo re ig n  investm ert alone 
w i l l  not p ro v id e  fo r  developm ent. A p p a re n tly  fo r  Guatemala 
and other s im ila r  n a tio n s , p o l ic ie s  th a t encourage domestic 
investm ent and re s o lu t io n  of so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  c r is e s  
Are needed in  a d d it io n  to  fo re ig n  investm ent as a source of 
c a p i t a l•
APPENDIX 1
P o l i t ic a l  In d ic a to rs ; Chronology
1954 Arbenz i s  ovtrth ro w n  *nd Colonel C a rlo s  C a s t i l lo
Armas is  in s ta l le d  in  a C IA -p lanned and -f in a n c e d  in va s io n  
and coup. Land reform  i s  re ve rse d , popular o rg a n iza t io n s  
crushed a d thousands k i l le d .
1957 C a s t i l lo  Armas is  a ssa sin a te d .
1950 General Miguel Yd ig oras Fuentes is  e le cte d
p re s id e n t
1959 The Cuban R e vo lu tio n ! F id e l C astro  takes power
1960 Yd ig oras a llo w s  the U nited S ta te s  to  t r a in  Cuban 
e x i le s  in  Guatemala fo r  the Bay of P ig s  in va s io n  o f Cuba. 
The C e n tra l American Common Market i s  form ed.
N o v .13 A major m i l . t a r y  u p r is in g  against Y d ig o ra s , 
in v o lv in g  o n e -th ird  o f the  army is  suppressed.
M a r.-A p r. Massive dem onstrations by stude nts  and w orkers in  
1962 Guatemala C it y  against the  Yd ig o ra s  governm ent.
Dec. 1962 The Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) g u e r i l la  
o rg a n iz a t io n  i s  formed and begins a n ti government a c t i v i t y  
in  the mountains o f nort/ieastern Guatemala.
Mar. 1963 Yd ig ora s i s  overthrow n in  a coup led by Colonel 
E n riqu e  P e ra lta  A zu rd ia .
1965 The c h ie f o f the U.8 m i l i t a r y  m ission i s  k i l le d
and a s ta te  of s ie g e  d e c la re d .
1966 J u l io  Cesar Mendez Montenegro is  e le c te d
p re s id e n t.
1966-69 U nited S ta te s  in c re a se s  m i l i t a r y  and economic a id  
to  Guatemala, and army co u n te rin su rg e n cy campaigns and 
re p re ss io n  by r ig h t -w in g  p a ra m ilita r y  squads in t e n s i f y .  U.S 
sends Green B e re ts , g u e r r i l la s  a re  decim ated and thousands 
are k i l le d .
1970 C olonel C a rlo s  Arana O s o r io  is  e le c te d  p re s id e n t.
✓
A one year s ta te  of s ie g e  is  imposed in  November and a new 
wave o f government re p re s s io n  b e g in s .
1974 General K je l l  Eugenio Laugerud G a rc ia . the
o f f i c i a l  p re s id e n t ia l c a n d ida te . i s  chosen over apparent 
e le c t io n  winner General E fra in  R ios  M ontt.
1973 The G u e r i l la  Army o f the  Poor <EGP) in i t ia t e s
g u e r r i l la  a c t i v i t y  in  the n o rth e rn  p a rt  o f the  Quiche 
p ro v in c e .
F e b .4 A m assive earthquake le a ve s  over 22.000 dead.
1976 77.000 in ju re d  and one m il l io n  hom eless.
A p r .1976 The N a tio n a l Committee of Trade Union U n ity  
(CNU8) i s  form ed.
Nov. 19 A p ro te s t  march of m iners from  Ixtahuacan,
1977 Huehuetenango i s  met by one hundred thousand 
su p p o rte rs  in  Guatemala C it y .
Mar. 1978 A p u b lic  w orkers9 s t r ik e  s h o r t ly  b e fo re  
p re s id e n t ia l e le c t io n s  fo rc e s  the  government to  approve 
wage h ik e s . General Fernando Romeo Lucas G a rc ia  i s  e le c te d
p re s id e n t i t  what was seen as an open ly  rig g ed  co n te st 
A p r .1979 The Committee of Campesino U n ity  is  form ed.
May 29 Over one hundred Kekchi In d ia n s  are k i l le d  by
1978 government tro o p s  and armed landowners in  Panzos,
A lta  Verapaz.
J u ly  1978 Lucas assumes power.
Oct .1978 A general s t r ik e  and la rg e  spontaneous p ro te s ts  
in  Guatemala C it y  fo rc e  the government to  revoke a 100 
percent c i t y  bus fa re  h ik e .
O c t .20 O i l v e r io  Castaneda de Leon, p re s id e n t o f the
1978 A s s o c ia tio n  o f U n iv e r s it y  Students i s  gunned
down.
Ja n . 25 D r. A lb e rto  Fuentes Mohr, form er government 1979 
m in is te r  and le a d e r o f the  Dem ocratic S o c ia l is t  P a r ty ,  is  
a ssa ss in a te d  in  Guatemala C i t y .
F e b .24 The Dem ocratic F ro n t A gainst R epression (FDCR) is
1979 form ed.
Mar. 23 Manuel Colom A rg u e ta , founder and lea der o f the
1979 s o c ia l dem ocratic  U nited  R e v o lu tio n a ry  F ron t
p a r ty  , i s  k i l le d  in  Guatemala C it y .
S e p t .18 The O rg a n iza tio n  o f the  People in  Arms (ORPA), a
1979 g u e r r i l la  o rg a n iz a t io n , announces i t s  e x is te n c e .
Jan 31. P a rt o f a group o f campesinos who had come to
1980 Guatemala C it y  from  Quiche to  p ro te s t  armed
re p re s s io n  in  t h e i r  v i l la g e s  occupy the Spanish embassy. 
P o lic e  storm  and firebom b th e  embassy b u ild in g  k i l l i n g  
t h i r t y -n i n e .
p re s id e n t i t  what was «een as an open ly  rig g e d  c o n te s t.
A p r .1978 The Committee of Campesino U n ity  i s  form ed.
May 29 Over one hundred Kekchi In d ia n s  are  k i l le d  by
1978 government tro o p s  and armed landowners in  Panzos,
A lta  Verapaz.
J u ly  1978 Lucas assumes power.
Oct .1978 A general s t r ik e  and la rg e  spontaneous p ro te s ts  
in  Guatemala C it y  fo rc e  the government to  revoke a 100 
percent c i t y  bus fa re  h ik e .
O ct.20 O i lv e r io  Castaneda de Leon, p re s id e n t of the
1978
down.
A s s o c ia tio n  o f U n iv e r s it y  Students i s  gunned
Ja n . 25 D r. A lb e rto  Fuentes Mohr, form er government 1979
m in is te r  and lea der o f  the  Dem ocratic S o c ia l is t  P a rty , i s  
a ssa ss in a te d  in  Guatemala C it y .
F e b .24 The Dem ocratic Front A g a in st R epression  (FDCR) i s
1979 form ed.
Mar. 23 Manuel Colom A rgueta , founder and le a d e r o f the
1979 s o c ia l dem ocratic  U n ite d  R e v o lu tio n a ry  F ro n t
p a rty  , i s  k i l le d  in  Guatemala C i t y .
S e p t .18 The O rg a n iza tio n  o f the  People in  Arms (ORPA), a
1979 g u e r r i l la  o rg a n iz a t io n , announces i t s  e x is te n c e .
Jan 31. P art o f a group o f campesinos who had come to
1980 Guatemala C it y  from  Quiche to  p ro te s t  armed
re p re s s io n  in  t h e ir  v i l la g e s  occupy the Spanish embassy. 
P o lic e  storm  and firebom b the  embassy b u ild in g  k i l l i n g  
t h i r t y -n i n e .
Feb.-Mar. Nearly 80,000 Indian and ladino farmworker* go 
1980 out on strike, forcing the government to raise
the minimum wage for farmworkers.
Nay 1, Forty thousand turn out for the Nay Day protest 
1980 march in Guatemala City, the last, above-ground
demonstration to take place in Guatemala. Dozens of 
demonstrators are kidnapped in the course of the march.
June 21 Twenty-seven trade union leaders are kidnapped 
1980 from the Guatemala City headquarters of the
National Confederation of Labor (CNT).
J u ly  14 Armed men in d is c r im in a te ly  shoot at stude nts  
1980 ste p p in g  o f f  p u b lic  buses at the  U n iv e r s it y  of
San C a r lo s ,k i l l in g  s e v e ra l.
J u ly  20 A fte r  the  murder o f two p r ie s t s  and two attem pts 
1980 on the  l i f e  o f th e  b ish o p , the  C a th o lic  D iocese
o f Quiche i s  e lo se d .
Aug. 1980 The army g a th e rs  re s id e n ts  o f San Juan C o tz a l,  
Quiche and shoots s ix t y  male v i l la g e r s .
Aug.24 Seventeen tra d e  un ion  le a d e rs  from  the  CNT are
1980 kidnapped from a C a th o lic  r e t r e a t  house in  P a lin ,
E s c u in t la .
Aug. 28 A v io le n t  f i v e -y e a r  long la b o r c o n f l ic t  a t 
1980 G uatem ala 's  U.8-owned Coca C ola  f ra n c h is e  is
re s o lv e d  a f t e r  an in te rn a t io n a l u n io n -le d  b o yc o tt fo rc e s
the  pa re n t company to  in te rv e n e .
S e pt. 6 The army a tta c k s  th e  town o f C h a ju l,  Q uiche, 
i960 bombing the  convent, b e a tin g  and in te r ro g a t in g
re s id e n ts  end k i l l i n g  at le a s t t h i r t y - s i x .
O ct. 1980 ORRA jo in s  EGR, FAR and the  Leadersh ip  Nucleus of 
the Guatemalan Workers P a rty  (PGT) in  a g u e r r i l la  a l l ia n c e .  
Jan . 1981 The g u e r i l la  a l l ia n c e  launches a co o rd in ate d  
campaign aimed at p re v e n tin g  the  in te rv e n t io n  o f Guatemalan 
tro o p s  in  E l S a lva do r du rin g  the Salvadorean g u e r r i l la s  
general o f fe n s iv e .
The Ja n u a ry  31st Popular F ron t (FP-31) announces 
i t s  fo rm a tio n .
F eb .-M a r. An estim ated f i f t e e n  hundred In d ia n  campesxnos 
1981 a re  re p o rte d  k i l le d  in  army massacres in
Chim altenango.
A p r.9  T* enty~ fou r people a re  massacred by machete in
1981 th u  v i l la g e  o f C h u a b a jito  in  San M artin
J ilo te p e q u e , Chim altenango.
A pr. 15 F o r t y  to  one hundred campesinos are  massacred in  
1981 th e  v i l la g e  o f Cocab in  N ebaj, Q uiche.
A p r .31 At le a s t  t h i r t y - s i x  campesinos are  k i l le d  in  an 
1981 a ttack  on the  to*n o f San Mateo Ix a ta n ,
Huehuetenango.
May 1981 The army bombs and la y s  s ie g e  to  the  v i l la g e s  of 
Tree  Aguadas, E l Caoba, E l Remate* and Raxmacan in  the 
Reten p ro v in c e . F iv e  hundred seek re fu g e  in  Mexico and 
i* ith in  days a re  deported  back to  Guatemala.
June 1981 N ineteen r u r a l  c o o p e ra tive s  in  the  Reten p ro v in c e  
a re  attacked by the  arm y. At le a s t  f i f t y  people  a re  k i l le d  
and 3,500 f l e e  to  M exico.
June 10 The Reagan a d m in is tra t io n  approves the s a le  of 
1981 3 .2  m il l io n  of m i l i t a r y  jeeps and tru c k s  to  the
Lucas governm ent.
J u ly  1981 host o f the  campesinos from the Peten c o o p e ra tive  
who had sought re fu g e  in  Mexico are  deported back to  
Guatemala.
J u ly  1? Two hundred s o ld ie r s  attack the v i l la g e  of Coya, 
1981 Huehuetenanago, as re s id e n ts  attem pt to  r e s is t
w ith  machetes s t ic k s  and sto nes. One hundred f i f t y  to  th re e  
hundred v i l la g e r s  a re  k i l le d .
Among a s e r ie s  o f g u e r r i l la  a c tio n s  commemorating 
the  1979 Nicaraguan re v o lu t io n ,  f i v e  hundred g u e r r i l la s  
occupy th e  t o u r is t  town o f C h ichicastenango, Quiche.
J u ly  28 U.8 p r ie s t  S ta n le y  Rother i s  k i l le d  in  Santiago
1981 A t i t la n ,  S o lo la .
A u g .12 As many as one thousand campesinos are  k i l le d  in  
1981 army a tta ck s  on two v i l la g e s  in  San Sebastian
Lemoa, Q uiche.
S e p t .1981 The army k i l l s  about seven hundred in  San Miguel 
C h ic a j and R a b in a l, Baja Verapaz.
O c t .-D e c . S o ld ie rs  burn homes, c rop s and k i l l  as many as 
1981 one thousand in  the Chupol re g io n  of
C h ich icastenango, Quiche.
O c t .10, G u e r r i l la s  launch a s e r ie s  o f bombing and 20,1981 
m i l i t a r y  a tta ck s  on p o l ic e ,  government and economic ta rg e ts  
in  Guatemala L i t y .
O ct. 28 G u e r r i l la s  s im u lta n e o u s ly  mount a tta ck s  on two
1 9 8 1 provincial capitals, Mazatanango and Soiola and
b r i e f l y  occupy tha  la t t a r .
Nov. 1981 Tha army c a r r ie s  out a major c o u n ta rm su rg a n c y  
o f fa n s iv a  in  tha  Chim altanango p ro v in c a .
N o v .22 Em atario  T o j,  la a d a r of CUC and E6P mambar.
1981 ascapas a Guatamala m i l i t a r y  basa c lo sa  to  fo u r
months 
fo rc a s .
a f t a r  h*> was kidnapped by govarnmant s a c u r it y
Dac.2 F iv a  hundrad g u a r r i l la s  a ttack  army posts  in
1981 Santa Cruz dal Q uicha.
Jan . 1982 A m ajor c o u n ta rin su rg a n c y  o f fa n s iv a  is  launchad 
in  tha  Q uicha, Chim altanango, Huahuatanango and San Narcos 
p ro v in c a s .
Ja n . 19 A la rg a  g u a r r i l la  fo rc a  a tta c k s  and n a a r ly
1982
basa.
o va rru n s  tha San Juan C o tz a l,  Quicha m i l i t a r y
Fab. 7 Tha EGP, FAR, ORPA and tha Laadarsh ip  N uclaus o f
1982 th a  PGT announca t h a i r  u n if ic a t io n  undar tha
um bra lla  o f tha  Guatemalan N a tio n a l R a v o lu tio n a ry  U n ity  
<URNG>.
Em H a d  la a d a rs  o f d i f f a r a n t  o rg a n iz a t io n s , 
• actors and id a o lo g lc a l p a rsu a s io n s  form  tha  Guatemalan 
Committaa o f P a t r io t ic  U n ity  (COUP) andors in g  tha  URNQ and 
t h a ir  p o in ts  f o r  a program o f govarnm ant.
Mar. 7 Ganaral Angal A n ib a l Quavara, o f f i c i a l
1982 p r a s id a n t ia l  c a n d id a ta , w ins a p l u r a l i t y  o f tha
vo ta s  amidst chargas o f fra u d  by th a  th re e  r ig h t -w in g
o p p o s it io n  candidates
Mar. 2 3 A b lo o d le s s  palace coup overth row s the Lucas
1982 government b e fo re  power i s  tra n s fe re d  to  Guevara.
•
General E f ra in  R ios Montt i s  in s t a l le d  as head of a 
three-m an ju n ta . F iv e  hundred people  are k i l le d  by s o ld ie r s  
in  the  v i l la g e s  of P a rra x tu t , El P a ja n t o  and P ic h iq u i l ,  
Quiche.
M ar.24 - H e lic o p te r bombing r a id s  k i l l  one hundred in  the 
27, 1982 v i l la g e s  of Las Pacayas, L i s i ram, El Rancho, 
Q u ix a l, and Chuyuc in  San C r is to b a l Verapaz, P ita  Verapaz.
M ar.2 8 - S o ld ie rs  k i l l  two hundred and f i f t y  and burn down
A p r .10, the v i l la g e s  o f E sta n c ia  de la  V irg e n , Chicocon,
1982 Choatalun and C h ip ! la  in  San M artin  J ilo te p e q u e ,
Chim altenango.
A p r. 3 -  S o ld ie rs  k i l l  most o f the  re s id e n ts  of C h e l, Jua
5, 1982 and Amachel in  C h a ju l, Quiche. In  one o f the
v i l la g e s  the women are  raped , the  men beheaded and the 
c h ild re n  tossed a g a in st the ro ck s  o f a r i v e r  bed.
Qver one hundred a re  k i l le d  in  the  v i l la g e  o f 
Mangal in  C h a ju l, Q uiche.
A pr. 12 The army burns down the  houses, f i e l d s ,  and
1982 fo r e s ts  in  San A n ton io  Ixch ig u an , San Marcos.
A pr. 15 S o ld ie rs  k i l l  over a hundred c h ild re n  and
1982 s e v e n ty -th re e  women in  R io  Negro, Baja Verapaz.
The b o d ie s  of the  women a re  found hanging from  the  tre e s  
w ith  th e  c h ild re n  on t h e i r  backs.
A pr. 18 The v i l la g e s  o f Agua Escondida and Xuguesa XI in
1982 Chi ch icastenango, Quiche, are  abandoned a f te r  the
houses and f ie ld s  a re  set a f i r e .
F i f t y - f o u r  persons are beheaded in  fiscal b a j. 
Quiche and the e n t ir e  v i l la g e  burned down.
A pr. 20 One hundred campesinos are massacred in  the
1982 v i l la g e  of Jo s e fin o s  in  La L ib e r ta d ,
Peten.
A p r .29 Two hundred campesinos are k i l le d  in  Cuar _o 
1982 P uerto  Quiche, and houses, crops and fo re s ts
burned down.
June 1982 One hundred campesinos a re  k i l le d  in  the v i l la g e  
o f Pampach in  T a c t ic ,  A lta  Verapaz.
One hundred s ix t y  o f the one hundred and e ig h ty  
fa m ilie s  l i v i n g  in  the  town o f Chi sec, A lta  Verapaz, are 
massacred.
June 9 R ios  Montt d e c la re  h im se lf p re s id e n t and s o le
1982 r u le r  o f Guatemala and the o the r two ju n ta  
members re s ig n .
J u ly  1 R ios  Montt d e c la re s  a s ta te  o f s ie g e .
Ja n . 7 The Reagan a d m in is tra t io n  l i f t s  the f iv e -y e a r  o ld
1983 embargo on arms s a le s  to  Guatemala; a pproving  the 
s a le  o f over 96.3 fra il ion  worth o f h e lic o p te r  spare  p a rts  
and m i l i t a r y  equipm ent.
Ja n .2 5 - Guatemalan s o ld ie r s  and government c i v i l  p a t r o ls
26,1983 e n te r Mexico and k i l l  fo u r  re fu g e e s a t S antiago  
e l V e r t ic e  and La Hamaca re fu g e e  camps in  Chiapas.
Mar.3  S ix  men a re  shot by f i r i n g  squad th re e  days
before the a r r i v a l  of Pope John Paul II, and1983
despite his pleas for clemency. This Mas the second mass 
execution o f persons tried in tfuatemaia’s secret military 
tribunals.
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